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PREDICTING OUTCOMES IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION
SUSAN D. FRANCK & LINDSEY E. WYLIE†
Crafting appropriate dispute settlement processes is challenging for
any conflict-management system, particularly for politically sensitive
international economic law disputes. As the United States negotiates
investment treaties with Asian and European countries, the terms of
dispute settlement have become contentious. There is a vigorous
debate about whether investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is an
appropriate dispute settlement mechanism. While some sing the
praises of ITA, others offer a spirited critique. Some critics claim that
ITA is biased against states, while others suggest ITA is predictable
but unfair due to factors like arbitrator identity or venue. Using data
from 159 final cases derived from 272 publicly available ITA awards,
this Article examines outcomes of ITA cases to explore those
concerns. Key descriptive findings demonstrate that states reliably
won a greater proportion of cases than investors; and for the subset of
cases investors won, the mean award was US$45.6 million with mean
investor success rate of 35%. State success rates were roughly similar
to respondent-favorable or state-favorable results in whistleblowing,
qui tam, and medical-malpractice litigation in U.S. courts. The Article
then explores whether ITA outcomes varied depending upon investor
identity, state identity, the presence of repeat-player counsel,
arbitrator-related, or venue variables. Models using case-based
variables always predicted outcomes whereas arbitrator-venue models
did not. The results provide initial evidence that the most critical
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variables for predicting outcomes involved some form of investor
identity and the experience of parties’ lawyers. For investor identity,
the most robust predictor was whether investors were human beings,
with cases brought by people exhibiting greater success than
corporations; and when at least one named investor or corporate
parent was ranked in the Financial Times 500, investors sometimes
secured more favorable outcomes. Following Marc Galanter’s
scholarship demonstrating that repeat-player lawyers are critical to
litigation outcomes, attorney experience also affected ITA outcomes.
Investors with experienced counsel were more likely to obtain a
damage award against a state, whereas states retaining experienced
counsel were only reliably associated with decreased levels of relative
investor success. Although there was variation in outcomes,
ultimately, the data did not support a conclusion that ITA was
completely unpredictable; rather, the results called into question some
critiques of ITA and did not prove that ITA is a wholly unacceptable
form of dispute settlement. Instead, the results suggest the vital debate
about ITA’s future would be well served by focusing on evidencebased insights and reliance on data rather than nonreplicable
intuition.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite experiencing a period of fiscal adjustment, worldwide
investment remains a lynchpin of global economic activity and
1
involves trillions of dollars. Governments across the world are now
focusing upon how to best use bilateral and multilateral investment
2
treaties as strategic tools to increase their economic prosperity.
Given their potential value in promoting economic competitiveness
3
within the global economy, President Obama’s 2015 State of the
4
Union Address focused on international economic treaties. The

1. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, at 84–86, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2012 (May 7, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2012]. In 2012, for example,
total worldwide foreign-direct-investment stock was approximately US$23 trillion. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value
Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, at xv, 217 annex tbl. 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2013 (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2013].
2. Canada recently finished negotiating an investment treaty with the European Union.
See Freya Baetens, Gerard Kreijen & Andrea Varga, Determining International Responsibility
Under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should
Know, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1218 n.66 (2014) (discussing CETA’s terms finalized,
which were in September 2014); Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), CAN. FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV., http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/KZ
7T-TXC6] (last updated June 12, 2015) (providing information on CETA).
3. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 706–08 (observing that early studies showed minimal evidence of a
connection between investment treaties and foreign investment, and that the majority of
empirical analysis and even “[t]he most sophisticated studies consider possible alternative
explanatory variables and still find that [treaties] that provide for investor-State arbitration are
correlated with increased investment.”). But see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 397, 399 (2011) (gathering literature that suggests mixed evidence linking the presence
of an investment treaty and derivative investment).
4. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-unionaddress-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/U9N4-UGAN]. After this Article was accepted for
publication, President Obama signed the Trade Promotion Authority Act that will permit the
Executive Branch to continue negotiating investment-related treaties. David Nakamura, In
Bipartisan Ceremony, Obama Signs Trade Legislation, Calls for Infrastructure Bill, WASH. POST
(June 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/06/29/in-bipartisanceremony-obama-signs-trade-legislation-calls-for-infrastructure-bill [http://perma.cc/7Q7T-KF
KY]; Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here’s What the President Signed into Law, WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(June 29, 2015, 3:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/29/trade-here-s-whatpresident-signed-law [http://perma.cc/TV3G-4KTA]; see also infra notes 16–18 (discussing
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United States is negotiating multilateral investment agreements with
trading partners across the globe, including the recently signed Trans5
Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the European Union–United States
6
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Meanwhile,
President Obama has initiated negotiation of bilateral investment
7
8
treaties with key trading partners, including India and China.
The existing web of signed international investment agreements
(IIAs) exceeds three thousand bilateral and multilateral investment
9
treaties. Those IIAs grant various substantive rights, including the
right to compensation for government expropriation and freedom
10
from discrimination, to people or entities investing abroad. In

public debates about ITA and the President’s authority to negotiate agreements). The playing
field of treaty negotiation will continue to evolve over the coming months and years, as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed but the text was not released until final revisions to
this Article.
5. Twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—signed the
TPP on October 5, 2015. David Nakamura, Deal Reached on Pacific Rim Trade Pact in Boost
for Obama Economic Agenda, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/deal-reached-on-pacific-rim-trade-pact/2015/10/05/7c567f00-6b56-11e5-b31cd80d62b53e28_story.html [http://perma.cc/JHJ6-RCKT]; see also Michael Froman, Remarks by
Ambassador Michael Froman at the Council on Foreign Relations the Strategic Logic of Trade,
20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 373, 375 (2014) (discussing TPP and how it will cover 50% of global
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)); David P. Vincent, The Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Environmental Savior or Regulatory Carte Blanche?, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–4 (2014)
(“[E]xisting TPP countries have a combined GDP of close to $20 trillion and a combined
population of over 650 million.”).
6. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 696–97 (stating that TPP and TTIP could
“govern the investment relations of 65% of the world economy”); Mark Weaver, The Proposed
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS Provisions, Reconciliation, and
Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 226 (2014) (discussing the history of
TTIP).
7. On January 26, 2015, President Obama met Indian government officials to promote a
U.S.-India bilateral investment treaty. See Remarks by President Obama at U.S.-India Business
Council Summit, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/26/remarks-president-obama-us-india-business-council-summit [http://perma.cc/
G3FE-M97A]; Kavaljit Singh, India/US Bilateral Investment Treaty Will Be No Easy Ride, FIN.
TIMES: BEYONDBRICS (Jan. 2, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/26/guest-postindia-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-will-be-no-easy-ride/ [http://perma.cc/GA7Z-6PAA].
8. See John R. Crook, China Agrees to Resume Expanded Bilateral Investment Treaty
Negotiations with United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 947, 947–48 (2013) (observing that the
United States and China agreed to restart negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty).
9. See, e.g., Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in
Sustainable Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 523–24 (2013) (discussing the
historical rise in the number of investment treaties from one IIA in 1959 to over 3,000 signed
IIAs in 2010).
10. See infra notes 43–45 (discussing substantive rights in IIAs).
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derogation of traditional international law principles where only
11
states can pursue international law remedies, IIAs contain ex ante
promises whereby states guarantee investors a forum to seek direct
redress for violations of substantive rights. In combination, the scope
of existing investment flows and treaties means a meaningful
proportion of international investment is currently protected by at
12
least one IIA and theoretically subject to treaty-based arbitration.
As investors have exercised their new international law rights to
redress alleged grievances, theoretical risk has become a reality. The
13
first investment treaty arbitration (ITA) award came in 1990, and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) estimated that, by 2014, claimants had initiated over five
14
hundred formal disputes.
With increased political, economic, and legal scrutiny on
international investment, ITA has become the center of debate in the
negotiation of international economic law treaties, particularly for
15
16
TPP and TTIP; spawned articles in the New York Times,
11. See Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2547 (2014)
(“[I]nvestor-state arbitration is something of an anomaly in international law because states
waive their sovereign immunity and make themselves vulnerable to legal claims by foreign
litigants alleging that they violated their international obligations as defined by treaty.”). In the
future, it may be worth exploring whether the anomaly, which provides individuals or entities
with direct access to arbitration for international law violations causing damage, might extend to
other international law wrongs affecting individuals.
12. See UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 1, at 217.
13. Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award,
¶ 18 (June 27, 1990), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1034.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SN5Q-45PB].
14. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Issues Note: Recent
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), No. 1, at 9–10, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2014/3 (Apr. 2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web
diaepcb2014d3_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CG5-HQA2] (suggesting the number of concluded
cases is more than 270, but failing to explain the definition for “concluded” cases to permit
comparison to existing datasets). But see JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 331 n.1 (2013) (“From 1960 through mid-1974, some 62 different
developing countries engaged in 875 nationalizations or takeovers of foreign enterprises.”).
15. Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution Under the Proposed Transpacific
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope?, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COMM. L. 1, 1–2
(2013) [hereinafter Trakman, TPP]; see also Sebastian Perry, Public Consultation Opens on EUUS Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 28, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/
32531/public-consultation-opens-eu-us-treaty [http://perma.cc/RU3B-PWKD] (discussing the
European Union’s public consultation on including ITA in TTIP); Germany to Reject EUCanada Trade Deal - Sueddeutsche Newspaper, REUTERS (July 26, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/germany-canada-trade-idUSL6N0Q10CS20140726?irpc=932&
ref=browsi [http://perma.cc/4HFY-U8WN] (suggesting Germany will reject a European Union
trade treaty primarily because of ITA).
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18

19

Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and The Economist; and
20
generated a robust congressional debate. Some stakeholders express
concerns that ITA is unpredictable, illegitimate, or exhibits a pro21
22
investor bias; yet others disagree and contend that these
16. Manuel Pérez-Rocha, Opinion, When Corporations Sue Governments, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-suegovernments.html [http://perma.cc/XPR7-TG7E]; Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), http://mobile.nytimes.
com/2015/03/26/business/trans-pacific-partnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html
[http://perma.cc/CD9M-863T].
17. Henry Farrell, People Are Freaking Out About the Trans Pacific Partnership’s Investor
Dispute Settlement System. Why Should You Care?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 26,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/26/people-are-freakingout-about-the-trans-pacific-partnerships-investor-dispute-settlement-system-why-should-youcare [http://perma.cc/HPN6-28KR]; Greg Sargent, Elizabeth Warren Fires Back at Obama:
Here’s What They’re Really Fighting About, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (May 11, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/05/11/elizabeth-warren-fires-back-atobama-heres-what-theyre-really-fighting-about [https://perma.cc/8ZUT-VHYM]; Greg Sargent,
Is TPP Trade Deal a Massive Giveaway to Major Corporations? An Exchange Between Obama
and Sherrod Brown, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/04/27/is-tpp-trade-deal-a-massive-giveaway-to-majorcorporations-an-exchange-between-obama-and-sherrod-brown [http://perma.cc/ZKV2-CT25].
18. William Mauldin, Dispute-Resolution System Fuels Criticism of Pacific Trade Pact,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dispute-resolution-systemfuels-criticism-of-pacific-trade-pact-1425330853 [http://perma.cc/ZAG4-NKP8].
19. Editorial, The Arbitration Game, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treatiesprotect-foreign-investors-arbitration [http://perma.cc/QU53-CZU9].
20. See generally Susan Davis, Senate Agrees to Debate ‘Fast Track’ Trade Bill, USA
TODAY (May 14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/14/senate-tradevote-fast-track/27306255 [http://perma.cc/XJ2S-DHXP] (discussing the Senate’s vote to begin
debate on TPA); Paul Kane, Obama Wins Trade Victory in the Senate, WASH. POST (May 22,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-wins-trade-victory-in-the-senate/2015/05/
22/1cb6958e-00c7-11e5-8b6c-0dcce21e223d_story.html [http://perma.cc/TRN9-58SG] (same).
21. See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, Do Treaties Matter? On Effectiveness and International
Economic Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 325, 336 (2011) (book review) (describing several Latin
American countries’ criticism of pro-investor bias in ITA); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy
Crisis] (discussing problems of legitimacy through inconsistent awards); Asha Kaushal, Revising
History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime,
50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491, 510 (2009) (arguing ITA awards are “unpredictable” and “extremely
generous to foreign corporations”); Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of InvestorState Dispute Settlement: An Overview 11 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper
No. 2006/1, 2006) (discussing problems deriving from inconsistency).
22. Compare PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW
LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
BOOM
(2012),
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/
profiting-from-injustice.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZRR4-2GGY] (arguing international arbitration
favors investors), with Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, From “Dealing in Virtue” to
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“objections that began as ideologically driven polemics have come to
23
be widely, but inaccurately, presumed as truths.” These competing
perspectives demand reexamination of how investment treaty
24
disputes should be resolved. The European Union is engaged in a
25
consultation process exploring the value of ITA, and the United
26
States likewise continues to debate ITA. Some have proposed
alternative or supplementary methods of managing investment treaty
27
28
conflict, whereas others advocate wholesale elimination of ITA. In
“Profiting from Injustice”: The Case Against “Re-Statification” of Investment Dispute Settlement,
55 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE (Jan. 2014), http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/Brower_Blanchard_to_Publish.pdf [http://perma.cc/MC3G-FUSH] (arguing investment
arbitration provides a neutral forum for dispute resolution).
23. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 699.
24. See generally MICHAEL WAIBEL, ASHA KAUSHAL, KYO-HWA CHUNG & CLAIRE
BALCHIN, THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
(2010); Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (“For
arbitration law and practice to effectively respond to criticism about the integrity of arbitration,
the focus of our inquiry should include not only apparent bias associated with individual
arbitrators, but also implicit and systemic bias.”); Kaushal, supra note 21 (discussing the
development of the international investment regime).
25. Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)
(European Commission Working Document, No. SWD(2015)3 final, Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf [http://perma.cc/SWG2-FW7P]. The
European approach to ITA remains in flux. While this Article was being revised for publication,
the European Union Parliament issued detailed proposals for an international investment court
to settle investment disputes. Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and
Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2015), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364 [http://perma.cc/D7MF-BNJK]. As these
normative reforms are ongoing and were made a few weeks prior to publication, they are
beyond the scope of this Article.
26. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Amy Lehr & Suzanne A. Spears, Corporate Social
Responsibility, 44 INT’L LAW. 213, 218 (2010) (observing the U.S. State Department’s Advisory
Committee on International Economic Policy “showed serious divisions existed between
members of the subcommittee that drafted the report on this issue”); Report of the
Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy
Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Annexes, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Sept.
30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm [http://perma.cc/B2T2-DZHN]
(exploring the text of a U.S. model investment treaty); supra notes 18, 20 (describing May 2015
congressional debates over “fast track” authority to prospectively authorize investment
treaties); see also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J.
775, 864–67 (2012) (discussing the importance of arbitration in international affairs).
27. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 196, 207–28 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, DSD] (exploring the
potential use of mediation and dispute systems design methodologies into investment-treaty
conflict); Susan D. Franck, Using Investor-State Mediation Rules to Promote Conflict
Management: An Introductory Guide, 29 ICSID REV. 66, 67–68 (2014) [hereinafter Franck,
Mediation] (discussing the future of investor-state mediation); Anna Joubin-Bret & Barton
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response, some states have exited the international investment law
regime, while others rely on preexisting paradigms for dispute
29
settlement.
In the midst of debates about whether to retain, or even increase,
the scope of arbitration by renewing existing IIAs or generating new
30
investment treaties, there is a dearth of empirical research
quantitatively analyzing ITA outcomes. Despite some literature
31
focusing on jurisdictional decisions, little quantitative research has
explored final outcomes or otherwise identified variables reliably
32
associated with results. Identifying these factors, however, is vital to
informed debates about the normative design of dispute resolution.

Legum, A Set of Rules Dedicated to Investor-State Mediation: The IBA Investor-State Mediation
Rules, 29 ICSID REV. 17, 23 (2014) (suggesting mediation as an alternative to arbitration);
Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 72 (2013) (recommending
integration of mediation to facilitate “trust-building and information exchange regarding
important underlying interests”).
28. See, e.g., infra notes 71–93 and accompanying text (discussing calls for reform related to
eliminating ITA or placing disputes into the hands of national court judges).
29. See, e.g., Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93
NEB. L. REV. 313, 314–16, 326–28, 338–47 (2014) (discussing the exit and entry of states in the
international investment regime).
30. Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 697 (estimating that 1300 IIAs were eligible for
renegotiation in 2013).
31. See generally Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301 (2008) (analyzing jurisdictional decisions,
preliminary measures, interpretations, and annulments but not final awards); Kathleen S.
McArthur & Pablo A. Ormachea, International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical
Analysis of ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction, 28 REV. LIT. 559 (2009) (analyzing ICSID
jurisdiction awards); Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211 (2012) (analyzing
jurisdictional awards); infra note 142 (identifying recently published research on ITA).
32. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empirically Evaluating] (providing
descriptive data about ITA outcomes); see generally Susan D. Franck, Development and
Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck,
Development] (analyzing outcomes as a function of respondent and presiding arbitrator
development status); Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825 (2011) [hereinafter Franck, ICSID] (analyzing
variations in outcomes as a function of cases against Latin American states, energy disputes,
applicable law and venue); Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel
Composition on Outcome in Investment Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267 (2012) [hereinafter
Kapeliuk, Games] (exploring panel effects and outcomes); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat
Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 47 (2010) [hereinafter Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment] (analyzing final outcomes as a
function of those rendered by “elite” arbitrators).
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This Article first offers an overview of the doctrine and debate
surrounding ITA. Second, it explains the data and methodology
underlying the analyses. Third, it provides descriptive data of ITA
outcomes. It identifies that the mean amounts claimed were
approximately US$660 million (US$100 million median), which
reflects a nontrivial risk of loss of fiscal resources for both investors
and states, particularly for small investors and developing states.
Despite the risk of fiscal exposure for states, states won
approximately 60% of the cases, and states won reliably more often
than investors. Turning to amounts awarded, for the set of all cases
that included investor losses, the average amount awarded was
US$16.6 million (US$0 median) and the average investor success rate
was 18% (2% median). Focusing exclusively on the small subset of
cases where investors obtained damages, investors obtained a mean
award of US$45.6 million (US$10.9 million median) and an average
success rate of 35% (29% median).
Next, given the variation in outcomes, the Article tests different
models to predict ITA outcomes. Historically, empirical research has
not attempted to test holistic theories of ITA outcomes, and has
33
rather focused on a limited number of variables. As ITA is
34
undertheorized, discussions about factors influencing outcomes are
not theoretically cohesive; rather, explanatory narratives generally
35
derive from intuition or conventional wisdom. This perhaps explains
36
why previous research was more limited in scope. One potential
33. See, e.g., Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 444–49 (analyzing only presiding
arbitrators, respondents and the interaction effect on ITA outcomes); Franck, ICSID, supra
note 32, at 85194 (conducting separate analyses to analyze the impact of Latin American
respondents, presiding arbitrators, and venue but limiting the analyses to roughly three
variables in any given model); see also infra text accompanying note 174 (exploring limits in
historical research).
34. See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2013) (“[T]he system as a whole is new and
undertheorized.”); Frédéric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on
Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 181, 183–85 (2014) (exploring
the absence of an underpinning theory for international investment law); see also Diane A.
Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations
and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51, 58–59 (2014) (describing aspects of
international investment law, and the intersection with international trade law, as “piecemeal
and unplanned, lacking a unifying logic”).
35. See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 691–99.
36. Another explanation was, as ITA is a relatively nascent area of law with a smaller
caseload, datasets were necessarily smaller and lacked the statistical power to conduct more
sophisticated multivariate analyses. See Susan D. Franck, Calvin P. Garvin & Jenna M. Perkins,
Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing International

FRANCK & WYLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/24/2015 4:42 PM

468

[Vol. 65:459

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

paradigm to explain ITA outcomes focuses on adjudicative factors,
37
namely arbitrators and venue, as the variables vital to outcomes. A
second paradigm involves case-related variables like claimant
identity, respondent identity, and the expertise of each party’s
38
lawyers. The analyses revealed that, although models focusing on
arbitrators and venue were never significant, case-based models
always predicted outcomes. The most reliable predictors of outcomes
were permutations of investor identity and experience of parties’
lawyers. Regarding investor identity, the most robust predictor was
whether the investors were human beings or corporations, with cases
brought by people exhibiting greater success than corporations; and
there was some evidence that Financial Times 500 (FT500) investors
had greater success than others in some, but not all, types of
outcomes. Regarding attorneys, investors retaining experienced
counsel were generally more likely to obtain favorable results, but for
states, retaining experienced counsel was only linked to decreased
levels of relative investor success. A hybrid model using any
significant predictor from earlier models also reliably predicted case
outcomes and exhibited a large effect size. Whether investors were
people and the expertise of respondents’ legal team remained
39
significant predictors of relative investor success.
Fifth, the Article identifies limitations of the research related to
case selection, external validity, underspecification of models, and
statistical power for the non-significant arbitrator-venue models.
Sixth, the Article synthesizes and interprets the data. While the
descriptive data indicate that investors won some cases, the results
40
disrupt claims that ITA exhibits a “pro-investor” bias; instead, they
offer preliminary evidence of a pro-state bias. The regression models
Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010-2011, at
883, 884, 896–900 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011) (identifying how previous research with smaller
samples had limited statistical power but explaining how effect-sizes identified the lack of a
large- or medium-sized effect).
37. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 84–86; see also Bohuslav Klein, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment
Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
65, 67 (2005) (arguing for a case-based approach to identifying proper ITA outcomes);
Sourgens, supra note 34, at 223–31 (arguing for case-by-case focus of ITA outcomes).
39. Aspects of this research are described in greater detail in SUSAN D. FRANCK,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: MYTHS, REALITIES, AND COSTS (forthcoming Oxford
University Press 2016).
40. See Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated
Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 378 (2014) (identifying claims that ITA is
“imbalanced, and biased in favor of foreign investors”).
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did not support claims that ITA outcomes were random. Rather, even
with variation, investor identity and counsel expertise were the most
reliable predictors of ITA outcomes. For investor identity, cases with
only human claimants fared better than their corporate counterparts;
and in some instances, cases involving at least one FT500 entity
achieved more favorable outcomes than those without an FT500
entity. While expertise of investor counsel was critical in models
related to outcomes that generated state liability or amounts
awarded, the expertise of state counsel predicted lower rates of
relative investor success. Variables—like respondent identity
(particularly state-development status and democracy levels), the
background of the tribunal as a whole, and the presence of repeat
arbitrators—might in the future be useful predictors of ITA
41
outcomes. None of the models identified a reliable link between
outcomes and the tribunal’s gender composition or whether the
arbitration venue was International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). These data call into question
conventional characterizations of ITA and undermine derivative
policy proposals recommending complete elimination of ITA. Future
research should replicate these analyses to explore whether other
aspects better explain ITA outcomes. In the interim, the results
suggest that debates about the future of ITA should remain robust.
Nevertheless, focusing on evidence-based insights, relying on data,
and minimizing emotive reactions that induce nonreplicable intuition
would best serve the debate.
I. DOCTRINE AND DEBATE ABOUT INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION
ITA is a sui generis hybrid of public and private international
law; it permits investors to vindicate substantive treaty rights that
states granted to investors by directly suing states for government
conduct that allegedly breached a treaty and created an adverse effect
42
on a foreign investment. To understand this relatively recent

41. It is possible that some variables are co-linear or result in confusion about inferential
attribution. See Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and Development? Examining Investment
Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 14 (2014) [hereinafter Franck, Conflating]
(failing to identify, after controlling for state democracy levels, any analyses locating reliable
links between outcome and respondent development status).
42. JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 38–39 (2011); KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER,
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international law phenomenon, the next part first explores the
doctrine and policy underlying ITA. After describing the mechanics
of ITA, it then highlights the derivative debate about ITA.
A. The Doctrine and Policy of ITA
The net objective of an IIA is to entice inbound foreign
investment and to protect a state’s own investors abroad while
minimizing the risk of state liability. IIAs grant reciprocal investment
rights—of a procedural and substantive nature—to foreign investors
43
from the signatory countries. Procedurally, IIAs offer clear dispute
resolution rights, including the right to arbitrate treaty disputes. After
complying with certain prerequisites, including submitting dispute
notices and attempting amicable settlement, IIAs permit investors to
44
initiate arbitration directly against a state. Substantively, IIAs
involve state promises that foreign investors will receive certain basic
treatment, including the right to freedom from expropriation without
proper compensation, the right to freedom from discrimination, and
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment. These rights are similar to
45
some, but not all, constitutional rights. Some ITA disputes involve

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 370 (2013); see also
Roberts, supra note 34, at 45–46.
43. In some, but certainly not all instances, IIAs secure the intended benefit of foreign
investment. See Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment
Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L ORG. 401, 429 (2011) (discussing the
utility of IIAs and securing investment flows, given threatened or successful ITA disputes);
Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The PoliticalEconomic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORG. 1, 28 (2011)
(reviewing conditions where IIAs are linked with increased investment). Compare Todd Allee
& Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over
Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010) (arguing that dispute resolution
provisions in bilateral investment treaties lead to differences in investment), with Yackee, supra
note 3 (suggesting there is minimal difference that dispute resolution provisions in treaties are
linked to investment flows).
44. ITA prevents blanket claims of immunity from suit—whether by virtue of the
sovereign-immunity or political-question doctrine—that might otherwise prevent investors from
bringing claims in national courts. See, e.g., Stephen E. Blythe, The Advantages of Investor-State
Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 47 INT’L LAW.
273, 274–79 (2013). IIAs also permit direct state-to-state dispute settlement of an investor’s
disputes under an IIA. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretative Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1,
5–10 (2014).
45. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000); see also Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of
Investor Rights under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties have a Bright Future, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48 (2005) (“These investment treaties act like economic bills of
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public law elements, like Zimbabwe’s expropriation of land belonging
to certain white farmers or the imposition of an environmental
regulation that has a de facto disparate impact on foreign
46
companies. Other disputes have a more commercial flavor, like
revocation of a banking license, breach of contract, or failure to pay a
47
dividend. Irrespective of whether they are representative, some ITA
disputes have become iconic. For example, investors sued Argentina
for its 2001 currency crisis that led to damages deriving from the
devaluation of the Argentine peso and Argentina’s imposition of
48
other emergency measures to stabilize its economy; and Philip
Morris sued Australia and Uruguay for plain-packaging cigarette
regulations claiming state administrative regulation of cigarette
49
packages constituted unlawful expropriation of intellectual property.
Historically, there were few options for investors to redress state
50
activity that adversely affected their foreign investments. Investors’
informal options entailed ignoring the conflict, absorbing the cost,
and pricing the investment accordingly. Other options included
securing political risk insurance coverage or otherwise asking the
investor’s home state to provide diplomatic support. More formal
options for resolving international investment disputes included
declarations of war, exercises of “gunboat diplomacy,” lobbying the
investor’s home state to invoke formal diplomatic relief, or soliciting
an investor’s home state to espouse its claim at the International
51
Court of Justice (ICJ). These options were largely unsatisfactory as
rights, which grant foreign investors substantive protections and procedural rights to facilitate
investment.”).
46. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 21 n.25.
47. See, e.g., Ross P. Buckley & Paul Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-Party
Participation before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 BANKING
& FIN. L. REV. 353, 366 (2007); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 712–13 (2007).
48. See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 42 (compiling cases).
49. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 4–9 (July 2, 2s013) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1531.pdf [http://perma.cc/SQ99-ASW8]; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v.
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration,
¶¶ 1.4–1.7, 7.3–7.5 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita
0665.pdf [http://perma.cc/38TS-VUQX].
50. Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s
Regulatory Autonomy Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 246–47 (2012);
Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 757–79.
51. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 1–25 (2012) (discussing the history of international investment law); Roberts,
supra note 44, at 3, 15–17, 44–45 (discussing gunboat diplomacy, diplomatic protection, other
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they generated large fiscal costs, politicized dispute resolution by
situating it within the sphere of international relations, prohibited
direct access to neutral dispute resolution, or otherwise failed to
52
provide a remedy to a damaged investor.
Against this backdrop, states signed IIAs to clarify substantive
rights and grant investors the capacity to pursue direct dispute
resolution for international investment law violations. ITA provided
investors with a direct forum for depoliticized adjudication that is
conducted by arbitrators who are required to be independent and
53
impartial and generates an enforceable award. The objective was for
states to avoid deciding whether to espouse an investor’s claim and
instead let investors choose, in light of net costs and benefits, whether
54
pursuing a claim was appropriate. ITA used a tried and tested
process—namely international arbitration—whose historical pedigree
offered an opportunity for adjudicative neutrality and an established
enforcement regime. In theory, ITA generated a balanced and
efficient form of dispute resolution that minimized commercial risk
55
and maximized rule of law.

forms of state-initiated dispute resolution, and the history of ITA); Jason Webb Yackee,
Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 391, 392–95, 406–08
(2012) (discussing historical options for dispute settlement in international investment law).
Although domestic dispute resolution was also available under domestic law through domestic
courts, even today, not all states exhibit comparative levels of rule of law. See generally TOM
GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2008) (discussing judicial empowerment in authoritarian regimes);
Mark Fathi Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States, 39
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2014) (arguing that authoritarian regimes benefit from embracing
international arbitration). See also Xin He & Yang Su, Do “Haves” Come Out Ahead in
Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 120, 132, 138 (2013) (identifying
government agencies or government-related companies as the biggest winners in Shanghai
courts).
52. See Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based
Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 465, 471–75 (2013) (discussing the origin of investorstate dispute settlement).
53. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (1st ed. 2008); Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in
International Investment Arbitration, 35 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 431, 451–53 (2013); Dominique
Hascher, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 Issues, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. 789, 791–92
(2012).
54. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 51–52 (2009).
55. SCHEFER, supra note 42, at 1–10, 509–14.
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B. The Mechanics of ITA
As a matter of mechanics, when an investor asserts that a host
state’s conduct violated a treaty’s substantive protections and
damaged the investment, IIAs generally permit the affected investor
56
to begin a formal dispute resolution. If the dispute is not otherwise
57
resolved through negotiation or mediation, the investor requires the
state to arbitrate in one of the predesignated forums to resolve the
58
dispute. Thereafter, each party can select one arbitrator; then either
an arbitral institution or the two co-arbitrators appoint a presiding
59
After signing statements of independence and
arbitrator.
60
impartiality, arbitrators resolve investment disputes in accordance
61
with the applicable law, which generally includes the substantive
62
provisions of the IIA and other international law principles. Parties
then gather facts and generate legal arguments for different phases of
the dispute, namely jurisdiction, merits, quantum, and costs. If
63
investors fail to establish jurisdictional prerequisites, the case

56. Much of the overview of ITA doctrine and arbitration mechanics derives from earlier
summaries. See, e.g., Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 3–7.
57. In some cases, treaties require investors to initially sue the state within the state’s own
courts for a period of time; and should a host state fail to act, investors can then initiate ITA.
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 72 (2009).
58. While IIAs vary, investors generally elect to arbitrate before (1) an ad hoc tribunal
using the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules, (2) the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or (3) the World Bank’s ICSID. There
is some evidence that IIAs permit investors to arbitrate at the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Issues Note:
Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Resolution, No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
WEB/DIAE/IA/2012/10 (Apr. 2012) (indicating only seven known ICC ITA cases); Jason W.
Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International)
Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008).
59. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 57, 1355–56, 1387
(2009); Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1543–44.
60. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124
(1995).
61. Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
45, 52–53 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 65 (1995); Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting
an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider, 17 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Oct. 2002,
at 2, 3.
62. Yas Banifatemi, Mapping the Future of Investment Treaty Arbitration as a System of
Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 323, 323–24 (2009); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules
of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 190–200 (2007).
63. Using the provisions established by the relevant treaty, investors must establish there is
(1) a qualifying investor, (2) a qualifying investment that is (3) brought under an enforceable
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terminates and the state is not liable. Otherwise, the dispute
continues to the merits where the tribunal assesses if the state
violated the treaty’s substantive protections by failing to provide the
promised protection. If there is no breach, the case terminates and
the state is not liable. Should there be jurisdiction and a breach on the
merits, the parties establish the value of the treaty breach at the
quantum phase. Cost awards, which allocate fiscal responsibility for
lawyer and arbitrator fees, can be made at any point in the
proceedings but typically occur at the end. Irrespective of whether
tribunals issue multiple awards in a single case, the tribunal ultimately
renders a final award that is enforceable worldwide under an
64
international arbitration convention.
C. The Debate over ITA
The popularity of ITA has ebbed and flowed over time. Initially,
many gave ITA “overwhelming praise” for its “unmitigated”
65
success. Supportive commentary came from international law
luminaries including Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, who praised the
66
benefits of ITA for capital-importing and exporting states. The
extolment of these virtues may reflect a time of increasing investment
flows, increasing volume of treaties, and few treaty disputes. During a
period of global economic growth, the benefits seemed tangible and
67
the risks appeared minimal. Voluntary compliance with adverse
treaty within a proper time frame. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 22–23. Any failure leads
to a lack of jurisdiction, no substantive treaty protection, and no treaty-based state liability. Id.
64. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 57, at 1–2, 25, 29; LUCY REED, JAN
PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 179–90 (2d ed. 2010).
Generally enforcement occurs under either the ICSID Convention or the New York
Convention, where there are opportunities for review of awards. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis,
supra note 21, at 1547–48, 1554–55.
65. David P. Riesenberg, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 985 (2011) (discussing the
satisfaction and praise for the existing ITA system and citing Jeswald Salacuse, Stephen
Schwebel, Thomas Wälde, Ian Laird and Joel Beauvais, who have championed ITA).
66. Kyriaki Karadelis, Schwebel Opens ICCA Miami with Defence of BITs, 9 GLOBAL
ARB. REV. 25 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32554/schwebelopens-icca-miami-defence-bits [http://perma.cc/WFJ8-V62V]; Stephen M. Schwebel, The
Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263,
265–68 (2009).
67. Early North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cases might have been
viewed as favorable when contrasted with prominent ICJ litigation. The United States, for
instance, was unable to establish an expropriation claim on behalf of investors. Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (July 20). By contrast,
although the first treaty permitting ITA was signed in 1959, the first arbitration award was
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arbitration awards was also preferable to decades of delay in public
68
international law adjudication. Some continue to praise ITA,
suggesting, “[s]tates and investors both stand to benefit from
69
international arbitration.”
Recent commentary expresses discontent with ITA. The AsianPacific Economic Cooperation refers to problematic “unpredictable”
70
ITA outcomes. UNCTAD’s World Investment Report echoed these
fears and highlighted concerns about “inconsistent readings of key
provisions in IIAs and poor treaty interpretation, improving the
impartiality and quality of arbitrators” and “assisting developing
71
countries in handling [ITA] cases.” Others state cases “can reach
into the billions” of dollars, citing one case that is a statistical outlier
72
without providing a holistic context. Meanwhile commentators

rendered roughly thirty years later. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITA/IIA/2 (2000), http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf [http://perma.cc/SSM9-H9KL] (describing the historical
evolution of BITs from 1959 to 1999); Mann, supra note 9, at 523 (noting the first treaty was
signed in 1959); Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Award, ¶ 18 (June 27, 1990), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita1034.pdf [http://perma.cc/SN5Q-45PB] (observing the first ITA award came in 1990).
68. In Metalclad, Mexico promptly paid U.S. investors after unsuccessfully challenging the
award in a Canadian court. Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 187 (2012). This contrasts with the nearly five
decades needed to obtain full compliance with a damages award rendered at the ICJ. See
Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court
of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 825 n.56 (2007) (explaining that the Corfu Channel case
settled 47 years after the original judgment). Compare Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (awarding the United Kingdom for damage to two ships in 1946), with
David J. Bederman, Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Albania
Claims, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 271, 272 n.11 (2012) (noting that Albania paid the Corfu Channel
ICJ judgment in October 1996).
69. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact
Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 202 (2012); see also Blythe, supra note 44, at 287–88
(discussing the benefits of ITA); Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at 698, 701–03, 707–08,
719–21, 758 (same).
70. Silvia Constain, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
PREVENTION STRATEGIES, at vii, 35 (June 2013), https://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/
IEG/20130625_IEG-DisputePrevention.pdf [http://perma.cc/7CTH-SGWM].
71. UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 1, at 86–88; see also UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note
1, at 110–17 (discussing the benefits of international arbitration). Others suggest ITA involves
considerable time and costs, and that cases “run, on average, several years and entail large costs
for both claimants and respondent States.” Kyla Tienhaara, Third-Party Participation in
Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L
ENVTL. L. 230, 240 (2007).
72. Note, supra note 11, at 2548–49.
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suggest ITA is a “legal monster” that involves “[p]rofiting from
[i]njustice” since “agreeing to arbitration [means] states have
74
accepted to be sued by the devil in hell.” Against this backdrop,
debates about ITA in South Korea, a country with over seventy IIAs
and no adverse ITA awards at the time, spawned physical fights by
75
parliamentarians in 2011. Academics issued a Public Statement
claiming ITA is not a “fair, independent, and balanced method for
the resolution of investment disputes and therefore should not be
76
relied on for this purpose.” Others have stated that ITA should be
abandoned to “reassert the integrity of our domestic legal
77
processes.” In an effort to critique ITA, protestors have even
78
performed a self-styled “exorcism” of lawyers practicing ITA.
Beyond
concerns
about
unpredictable outcomes
or
79
inconsistency, some complain that ITA reflects a reliable pro73. Mahnaz Malik, The Legal Monster That Lets Companies Sue Countries, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/04/
bilateral-investment-treaties [http://perma.cc/Z85F-4PAZ]; see also EBERHARDT & OLIVET,
supra note 22, at 10–11, 24, 73 (including references to ITA as a “monster”); George Monbiot,
This Transatlantic Trade Deal is a Full-Frontal Assault on Democracy, THE GUARDIAN:
COMMENT IS FREE (Nov. 4, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-on-democracy [http://perma.cc/WW69-U7MH] (stating
ITA is a “monstrous assault”); Discover the Dark Side of Investment, TRANSNAT’L LAW INST.
(June 27, 2012), https://www.tni.org/en/article/discover-dark-side-investment [http://perma.cc/
7VZ9-S3BQ] (providing video that offers a caricature of ITA).
74. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22, at 11.
75. Associated Press, South Korea Passes U.S. Free-Trade Agreement, Lawmaker Sets Off
Tear Gas Canister in Protest, FOX NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/
11/22/south-korea-passes-us-free-trade-agreement-lawmaker-sets-off-tear-gas-canister
[http://
perma.cc/BRL8-LY3Z]; Alison Ross, Arbitration Clause Sparks Protests in Korea, 6 GLOBAL
ARB. REV., Nov. 29, 2011, http://globalarbitrationreview.com/b/29995 [http://perma.cc/3V8PF2FF].
76. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (Aug.
31, 2010), http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31august-2010 [http://perma.cc/DTA4-E37S]. The signatories stated there “is a strong moral as
well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose
investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration awards.” Id.
77. An Open Letter From Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TPP LEGAL (May 8, 2012,), https://tpp
legal.wordpress.com/open-letter [http://perma.cc/Q6X7-CAX6].
78. Meredith Hobbs, Activists Perform ‘Exorcism’ on King & Spalding in London, DAILY
REP. (May 4, 2015), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202725385488/Activists-PerformExorcism-on-King-amp-Spalding-in-London?slreturn=20150615112520 [http://perma.cc/RH5SECU3]; see also Global Justice Now, Reverend Billy Exorcises a Corporate Law Firm in
London, YOUTUBE (May 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tAztBns9jg [http://
perma.cc/QVC9-SQSS] (providing video footage of the “exorcism”).
79. See Note, supra note 11, at 2548 (observing that ITA outcomes are “notoriously
unpredictable” and parties cannot “predict the outcome or value the dispute”); Daniel S.
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80

investor bias. Under this critique, while ITA outcomes may be
predictable, they are influenced by spurious adjudication variables
like arbitrator identity or arbitration venue. For example, some
commentators suggest that arbitrators themselves are biased in favor
81
of investors and otherwise posit that arbitrator identity is a critical
82
component of outcomes. Likewise, commentators suggest the
arbitration venue determines outcomes, and awards rendered at
83
ICSID are biased. Rather than focusing on adjudicative variables,
other commentators critique ITA by suggesting that outcomes may
depend upon case-specific variables, such as the identity of the
84
85
86
investor, the respondent, or their counsel.

Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 47, 78
(2008) (discussing claims that ITA outcomes are “remarkable for . . . their lack of coherence”).
But see Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 473, 487 (2009) (arguing
that ITA outcomes are not as unpredictable as critics state).
80. See supra text accompanying note 21. But see Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3, at
710–11 (identifying but rejecting arguments related to pro-investor bias).
81. Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in WAIBEL ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 433–53; Van Harten, supra note 31, at 216–19. But see Maupin, supra note 40,
at 386 (expressing reservations as to whether arbitrators are biased towards investors); Meyers,
supra note 79, at 78 (disagreeing with claims of arbitrator’s pro-investor bias).
82. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, at 3 n.9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/
2013/4 (June 2013), http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf [http://
perma.cc/S2YC-2NJV] (positing “outcomes can be explained” by the fact that “often they
represent the differences in the views of individual arbitrators”); id. at 4, 9 n.43 (observing the
focus on arbitrators means lawyers conduct “intensive research on each arbitrator candidate”
and observing parties spend “significant resources . . . researching arbitrator profiles”); M.
SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 82 (3d ed. 2010) (arguing
that arbitrators “often show a near-fundamentalist zeal for investment protection”); Kapeliuk,
Games, supra note 32, at 272–79, 292–311 (focusing on panel effects on outcomes); Kapeliuk,
Repeat Appointment, supra note 32, at 47, 50–54, 70–71, 74–90 (focusing on outcomes rendered
by elite arbitrators); Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.
388, 388–91, 399–401, 403–22 (2014) (identifying a network effect among ITA arbitrators but not
analyzing outcomes); Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 23, 32 (Dec. 13,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/laweconworkshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 [http://perma.cc/3YK3-UM4W] (focusing on the
political preferences and repeat appointments of arbitrators to predict ITA outcomes).
83. See Brower & Blanchard, supra note 3 (describing claims by Venezuelan government
officials that ICSID is a biased forum); Franck, ICSID, supra note 32 (exploring claims of bias at
ICSID); Leon Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 611 (2012)
[hereinafter Trakman, ICSID] (exploring claims of bias at ICSID).
84. See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra at 22, at 8 (arguing there is a pro-corporate bias in
ITA as “prominent arbitrators . . . [n]early all share businesses’ belief in the paramount
importance of protecting private profits”); Bijlmakers, supra note 50, at 263–64 (describing how
businesses make arbitrator appointments); infra note 180.
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Some states have voted with their feet. Russia has withdrawn
from the Energy Charter Treaty after an investor established
jurisdiction over disputes related to the dissolution of Yukos Oil, and
87
a July 2014 award subjected Russia to over fifty billion in damages.
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have withdrawn from the ICSID
88
Convention. The President of Ecuador has rejected ICSID, claiming
ICSID “signifies colonialism, slavery with respect to transnationals,
89
with respect to Washington, with respect to the World Bank.” In
October 2012, Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Integration similarly called an ICSID award “unjust, illegal,
90
illegitimate and absurd.” Other states have encouraged the
85. See Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 438–39 (gathering sources conveying
concerns about disparate treatment of states in ITA); see also Brower & Blanchard, supra note
3, at 710 (identifying concerns that ITA is “biased against the developing countries”); Trakman,
ICSID, supra note 83, at 611 (noting the perception that institutionalized arbitration protects
the interests of developed states).
86. See Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time For a Legal Assistance Center
for Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 252
(2007) (“[A] party’s lawyers’ level of expertise will likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of
the dispute. The importance of having access to legal expertise is only magnified in a specialized
area of the law like [ITA] with which most lawyers have little familiarity.”); Catherine Rogers,
The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 358 (2007)
(highlighting that some developing nations have gained expertise in investment arbitration and
its potential impact); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–102 (1974) (discussing the impact of
repeat players in domestic litigation).
87. See John Defterios, Yukos Win Delivers Blow to Russia’s Putin, CNN (July 28, 2014,
10:33 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/28/business/analysis-defterios-yukos-rosneft [http://
perma.cc/E78Y-3GR5] (discussing the US$50 billion award); Alison Ross, Russia Withdraws
from Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Aug. 7, 2009), http://globalarbitrationreview.
com/news/article/18495 [http://perma.cc/3ACC-FRXD] (discussing treaty withdrawal). Because
the award was beyond the cutoff date of the dataset, it is not included in the statistical analyses
contained in this Article.
88. Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals for
Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239, 241–42 (2012); see also WAIBEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 216;
Trakman, TPP, supra note 15, at 1–15, n.65.
89. Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 604.
90. Ecuador Will Require Invalidation of Fault of the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Favor of Occidental. Minister: Ricardo Patiño, ECUADOR
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y MOVILIDAD HUMANA (Oct. 10, 2012, 12:36 PM),
http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuador-will-require-invalidation-of-fault-of-the-internationalcenter-for-settlement-of-investment-disputes-icsid-in-favor-of-western-minister-ricardo-patino
[http://perma.cc/W3VM-Z986]; see also Cancillería Ecuador, Ecuador Exigirá Nulidad de Fallo
de CIADI a Favor de Occidental, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=aGP1i8-h0qM&feature=share&list=UUkww-pqCcJ8D4O_ewd_l4hw [http://perma.cc/3EJ8JZ5B] (presenting a Spanish language video of Ricardo Patiño). President Correa has also
apparently called the international arbitrators involved in resolving one ITA dispute “pimps.”
Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Hon. Richard C. Wesley,
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“reemergence of the ‘toothless’ investment treaty” which, like older
treaties of Friendship Navigation and Commerce, provides
91
substantive rights but no forum. Australia stated its intention to
reject ITA in future IIAs because of efficiency concerns related to
92
costs, fractious disputes, and treaties’ net value.
Not all states agree and instead have retained ITA. In April
2012, after a contentious consultation process, the United States
93
crafted a model IIA that provided for ITA. China also changed its
approach to ITA by broadening the scope of arbitration to permit
94
tribunals to assess both merits and damages. Canada, which has had
its investors bring claims, and paid awards after losing cases as a
95
respondent, changed its model IIA while retaining ITA. A trilateral
investment treaty among China, Japan, and Korea likewise preserved
96
ITA as a means of dispute settlement. Even Australia, after a

Hon. Amalya L. Kearse & Hon. Barrington D. Parker, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit 9 (June 1, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw4316.pdf [http://perma.cc/9DKZ-667G].
91. Riesenberg, supra note 65, at 980, 987; UNCTAD, WIR 2012, supra note 1, at 139–40;
see also Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 658 (noting that Friendship, Navigation, and
Commerce treaties provided only diplomatic protection, rather than formal dispute settlement).
92. Trakman, ICSID, supra note 83, at 648–49 (discussing and quoting the Australian
Productivity Commission); see also AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND
PROSPERITY 14 (Apr. 2011), http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20
Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf [http://perma.cc/7YQZ-2JMH]. But see Luke Nottage, Why
No Investor-State Arbitration in the Australia-Japan FTA, EAST ASIA FORUM (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/09/why-no-investor-state-arbitration-in-the-australiajapan-fta [http://perma.cc/FH2J-XNBQ] (stating Australia included ITA in a treaty with South
Korea).
93. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm [http://perma.cc/XT6C-BSVD].
94. See generally NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT
TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (2009) (discussing Chinese policy).
95. Canada’s Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), CAN.
FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV. (May 27, 2015), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa-apie.aspx?lang=eng
[http://perma.cc/
962U-BKYH]. Canada’s recent treaty with the European Union retained ITA. See supra note 2
and accompanying text; see also Consolidated CETA Text, CAN. FOREIGN AFF., TRADE & DEV.
(Sep. 26, 2014), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng [http://perma.cc/R3QT-WRZ9] (providing the
text of the recent treaty).
96. AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR
THE PROMOTION, FACILITATION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT, art. 15 (May 13, 2012),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf [http://perma.cc/XUX8SB5R].
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national election leading to a change in government, included ITA in
97
a treaty recently negotiated with South Korea. Meanwhile, although
recent commentary in the media reflects varying perspectives on
98
ITA’s value, states continue to renegotiate investment treaties, and
99
100
ITA appears to be a viable option in TPP and TTIP.
Ultimately, the policy debate about ITA is a live issue with
critical international political and economic ramifications. The
normative and institutional design of dispute settlement will benefit
from information that scientifically identifies variables contributing to
ITA outcomes.

97. Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/kafta/official-documents/Pages/chapter-11-investment.aspx
[http://perma.cc/AUE2-VYQK] (providing the text of the Korean-Australia investment
agreement recently negotiated that provides for ITA in articles 11.15 to 11.28); see Australia
Concludes FTA Negotiations with the Republic of Korea, AUSTL. MINISTER FOR TRADE & INV.
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/2013/ar_mr_131205.html [http://perma.cc/
VHP7-892P] (discussing the treaty). But see Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/
Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Korea-Australia_Free_Trade_Agreement [http://perma.
cc/TN5B-VUZ4] (indicating the treaty was pending before the Australian Parliament until
August 29, 2014).
98. Compare Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone
Should Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/killthe-dispute-settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e11e4-b274-e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/FXQ6-WQ9X] (“If a final TPP agreement
includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be multinational
corporations.”), with Editorial, Don’t Buy the Trade Deal Alarmism, WASH. POST (Mar. 11,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-buy-the-trade-deal-alarmism/2015/03/11/
41575fee-c1d5-11e4-9271-610273846239_story.html [http://perma.cc/V4B9-WHBR] (“Critics
trumpet ISDS horror stories, but upon closer inspection they generally turn out not to be so
horrible.”). See also supra notes 16–18, 20.
99. TPP was signed on October 5, 2015, during the final revisions to this Article. See supra
note 5. Before the TPP text was made public, the U.S. Trade Representative indicated ITA is
part of TPP. U.S.T.R., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: UPGRADING AND IMPROVING
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgradingand-Improving-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P78A-FE
UB]. The full text of TPP is now available. See TPP Full Text, U.S.T.R., https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [http://perma.cc/L22W59DJ].
100. EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences to U.S. Approach, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 12, 2013, at 22; see also supra notes 4–6, 15, 20 and accompanying text. But
see supra note 25 (identifying that the EU may prefer the creation of a permanent court to
resolve treaty disputes).
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II. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This Article examines ITA cases empirically to better
understand possible predictors of outcomes from arbitral tribunals.
The objective is both to permit states negotiating treaties to formulate
dispute resolution strategies and to aid parties in understanding the
relative risk of ITA. Given debates about party identity, arbitrators,
and outcomes, our analyses included independent variables for the
background of investors, states, lawyers, arbitrators, and venue. This
section therefore first clarifies the unit of analysis, identifies how the
dataset was created, and describes the variables and models used to
conduct analyses to predict outcomes.
A. Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis was ITA awards that were publicly available
as of January 1, 2012. This included all public awards involving the
resolution of a treaty-based investment dispute, which necessarily
included awards rendered in English, Spanish, and French. The
method for gathering publicly available awards was the same
101
methodology used in previous research. As there is no single agreed
repository for ITA awards, the primary source of the public awards
was Professor Andrew Newcombe’s website, ITAlaw.com. This was
supplemented and checked against other resources including the
UNCTAD website, the ICSID website, the ICSID Review, and other
102
sources.
International arbitration, depending on the applicable
international law, varies in the formal doctrinal definition of “award”
and distinguishes among types of tribunal activity. Awards—namely
elements of cases that resolve dispositive key legal issues—under the

101. See Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 16–21 (describing the
methodology used in previous research on ITA).
102. The UNCTAD Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement cases is
available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISDS.aspx. ICSID awards are searchable at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx. ICSID cases are
available in print form, including the AIG v. Kazakhstan case referenced on Prof. Newcombe’s
website, ITAlaw.com, but only published in ICSID Reports. Likewise, SCC cases are accessible
through its website, http://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/swedish-arbitration-portal, or the
Stockholm International Arbitration Review. Public awards were cross-checked through
subscription websites like the APPLETON-ISR database on Westlaw, the Oxford University
Press website Investmentclaims.com, and the Investor-State Law Guide. NAFTAclaims.com was
also checked for cases arising under NAFTA.
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104

ICSID Convention, New York Convention, or the UNCITRAL
105
Model Law have specific but slightly different legal meanings.
As this research examined all ITA cases, it adopted a precise
definition of “award.” Namely, an “award” was a tribunal decision
creating a dispositive and binding determination on a substantive
phase, namely decisions on (1) jurisdiction; (2) merits; (3) quantum of
damages; (4) allocation of costs; or (5) settlement agreements or
106
other orders indicating a dismissal or discontinuance. This means
that decisions providing information on the dispute—including
interim measures, decisions on confidentiality, place of arbitration,
arbitrator challenges, tribunals’ interpretive decisions, ad hoc
Annulment Committees and subsequent decisions by national
courts—were not coded. Disputes with only a dispute notice or
107
arbitration request were omitted.
Three selection effects limit the inferential value of the unit of
analysis. First, the dataset is a time-bounded population of ITA
disputes that were derived from public awards. It necessarily means
that it is possible that the population has continued to evolve and the
external validity of this research is arguably limited. For example,
awards rendered after January 2012 have continued to add variance
to the population. While replication is required, multiple elements of
the research demonstrate that key elements of ITA been stable over
time. Even with the temporal limitation, the analyses provide a
baseline for future consideration.

103. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States art. 48, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (defining an award); see also ICSID Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings, Rules 41, 43–45 (ICSID Apr. 10, 2006) (providing rules for preliminary
objections to jurisdiction and discontinuances).
104. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
105. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, at arts. 17–17J, 30–33, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006), http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/22
LV-95C2] (defining interim measures as awards capable of enforcement and defining other
enforceable awards).
106. For outcomes, only the final award was analyzed. The methodology was similar to
research analyzing ICSID awards on jurisdiction, merits, settlements, or orders for
discontinuances. See Kapeliuk, Games, supra note 32, at 302 (describing the methodology for
studying ICSID disputes).
107. Cases with dispute notices or arbitration requests were omitted because the limited
information prevented reliable coding of outcomes.
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Second, private awards could differ meaningfully from public
awards, thereby limiting the value of inferences. The dataset reflects
that, of the small subset of initially confidential cases in 2006, many
108
have entered the public domain. Case selection bias may be limited,
however. Irrespective of whether investors or states are successful,
both types of parties have incentives to disclose awards. Investors, for
example, may disclose awards because shareholders may positively
view information that the investor has won a claim and created
greater commercial certainty. Likewise, states may believe that
notifying the public that they have won a case may restore confidence
in the government or have another political use.
Third, other investment-related conflicts were not coded. These
types of conflicts either relate to formalized investment treaty
109
disputes or conflicts that never crystalized into formal disputes. As
Professor Reisman explains, given the “very large” scope of
international investment, the 80,000 multinational enterprises and
their 100,000 affiliates, and the possibility of claims under 3,000
treaties, “then the number of actual disputes going to arbitration
seems to be a miniscule fraction of the universe” of investment and
110
investment conflict. This necessarily means that—by focusing on
public arbitration awards—the research omits larger questions of

108. There did not appear to be any meaningful difference between awards that were
initially private but became public and those that were historically public, and there was rough
parity in the identity of parties, arbitrators and outcomes.
109. Two categories of formalized disputes were not analyzed. First, ITA disputes with a
dispute notice—like those listed on the ICSID website—were in progress but there was
unreliable public information. Even listing a case at ICSID does not guarantee the case involves
ITA, as ICSID also has jurisdiction over domestic contract law or domestic investment law
disputes. Second, there could be latent, non-formalized investment disputes. Investment-related
problems arise every day. We are unaware of datasets measuring the latent scope of investment
treaty conflict. States may implement programs to prevent or minimize conflicts leading to
formal dispute notices; or parties may use alternative dispute resolution strategies to address
conflicts prior to an investor submitting a formal dispute notice. Client counseling and costbenefit assessments may also impact dispute settlement as (1) an investor might abandon its
claim or seek alternative commercial redress or (2) a state may address a disputed measure or
otherwise redress state activity. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3EBA-7ETZ] (exploring the ISDS system holistically, existing processes of
addressing treaty conflict, and alternative means for ISDS). The full range of unreported and
informal disputes is likely larger but unknowable.
110. W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best
Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 185, 186 (2009).
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investment conflict. Narrowing the field of inquiry generates
contained analysis based on available information.
B. Generation of the Dataset
The current dataset grew from earlier research (Generation 1 or
G1 research). The five additional years of data expanded the number
of publicly available awards by approximately 250% and increased
112
the number of cases by 300%. Multiple coders coded raw data from
awards with an initial 94.7% rate of intercoder agreement; and all
divergences were later resolved.
C. Variables Analyzed and Modeling
Part III provides descriptive analyses exploring both the starting
point and the final result of ITA. First, we descriptively examined
amounts claimed, which measures the amount of damages claimed by
113
investors in a common currency of U.S. dollars adjusted for
114
inflation.
Defining a “win” in ITA is complex, as subjective definitions of a
“win” create confusion, inject variance, and impede consistent

111. International trade research has analyzed World Trade Organization settlements that
involve “negotiations in the ‘shadow of the law.’” Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing
Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 720 (2003). Future research might usefully explore these
aspects of investment treaty conflict. Research offering information about how the legal shadow
of ITA operates—either reliably or randomly—offers a baseline for understanding how, when
and why pre-arbitration negotiations may be effective.
112. Coding occurred in three time periods. G1 data was collected from the beginning of
ITA until June 1, 2006. Generation 2 (G2) data was collected from public awards between June
1, 2006 and June 1, 2009. Generation 3 (G3) data was collected from awards in the public
domain between June 1, 2009 and January 1, 2012. Cases unavailable before January 2012 were
not coded. G2 and G3 data collection identified awards that, although once private, became
public. All coders received extensive coding training for approximately four weeks prior to
coding raw data.
113. Values were recorded in original U.S. Dollar amounts. If the original currency was not
in U.S. Dollars, the currency was converted into U.S. Dollars as at the date of the award. When
possible, the currency conversion was based upon figures from the FX Converter available at
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic using the interbank rate.
114. Adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the
Minneapolis U.S. Federal Reserve, using the website originally located at http://www.
minneapolisfed.org, which now appears to be located at https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates1913 [http://perma.cc/FTZ3-YYZ4]. The date of the award and January 1, 2011 were used for
the conversion to adjust for inflation using US$ values in 2011.
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115

measurement across cases. This research therefore used three
different, objective, fiscally derived variables. Using a final award’s
dispositif, which identifies the award’s core decisions, the research
assessed when tribunals identified a compensable treaty breach or
derivative damages. A first measure of outcome was operationalized
using a binary categorical variable. Results were classified according
to whether (1) the tribunal awarded an investor at least US$1, namely
116
an “investor win,” or (2) the tribunal failed to award an investor
damages (i.e. an award of US$0), namely a “respondent win.” A
second measure assessed amounts awarded using a continuous
measure of the fiscal amount a respondent was obligated to pay an
117
investor in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollars. This second measure
included awards reflecting settlements or discontinuances. A third
measure examined investors’ relative success rate, or the percentage
awarded to investors relative to their asserted claim; higher values
118
reflect higher levels of relative investor success.
To explore a multiple regression approach for analyzing ITA
outcomes for amounts awarded and relative investor success, Part IV

115. Some investors obtaining ITA compensation nevertheless subjectively viewed the
outcome as a “loss.” See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in
Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 7, 8–9 & n.3
(2005) (referring to remarks by Grant Kesler, former CEO of Metalclad who successfully
recovered over US$16 million from Mexico). Others suggest, even if a state is not liable, the
mere existence of a dispute is a “loss.” See SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY,
CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK’S INVESTMENT
COURT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE
UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, at ix, 4 (2007)
(describing how Argentina settled an ITA dispute with an investor); Nathalie BernasconiOsterwalder, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States
on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 69, 69 (2005) (arguing that the host State
never wins because it has no rights, only obligations and cannot bring claims). Still others
suggest settlement is a “loss”—even where parties agree on the outcome—because settlement
involves some deviation from an original position). See EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22,
at 9, 13, 22, 30, 58.
116. ATA Construction v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (May 18, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0043.pdf
[http://perma.cc/94DK-VFV2],
was the only case where the tribunal awarded specific performance in lieu of damages; this was
coded as an investor win as specific performance was a substitute for damages.
117. As arbitration costs and interest were coded separately, this variable only pertained to
fiscal liability for treaty breach.
118. But see Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule
of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.
1147, 1157–58 (2015) (identifying that defining “wins” in ITA has limitations, using one variable
to identify an investor “win” when there was some measure of damage awarded and also
measuring a state “win” when investors were awarded less than 25% of claimed damage).
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includes analyses examining two different theories of arbitration
outcomes: whether (1) case-related or (2) arbitrator-and-venuerelated factors contributed to outcomes. For the case-based
119
paradigm, variables reflected investor identity, respondent identity,
and experience of parties’ legal counsel. For the arbitrator-venue
120
121
based paradigm, variables included panels’ gender composition,
panel’s composite-development status, whether the chair was a repeat
player with multiple appointments, and venue. Although our analyses
122
were primarily concerned with extralegal factors, the claim’s legal
123
merits or other variables could contribute to outcomes. The
challenge in ITA is that the absence of de jure precedent or an
appellate body creating legal coherence makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to identify legally correct outcomes ex ante. Given these
constraints, “it is impossible to control for the most essential
124
variable,” namely, “the ‘correct’ legal outcome in a particular case.”
Rather than abandon efforts to offer empirical insights, we prefer to
acknowledge the difficulty. We also identify the constraints as a
reason to prefer models analyzing relative investor success, as that
variable uses a common scale to evaluate all cases and offers some

119. See supra notes 38–39, 84–86 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
121. We are unaware of published literature suggesting gender affects ITA outcomes. But
see Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 34–35, 37 (providing unpublished analysis suggesting women
decide some ITA issues differently). In other contexts, adjudicator gender influences outcome.
See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761, 1776–79 (2005) (identifying the presence
of at least one female judge on panels reviewing sexual harassment and discrimination cases
affects outcome). There are concerns about the lack of women in ITA. Franck, Empirically
Evaluating, supra note 32, at 81–83 (noting less than 10% of ITA arbitrators are women); Susan
D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias A. Lehmann & Anne van Aaken, The Diversity
Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L., 429, 434, 451–55, 467–69, 480–82, 489–90, 492–93 (2015) (identifying gender
diversity concerns in international arbitration). We thus believed it prudent to explore whether
gender influenced outcomes.
122. Jury research often examines extra legal factors and impact on outcomes. Brian H.
Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-legal Factors and Product Liability: The Influence of Mock
Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions about the Cause of Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 127, 127 (1994); John Hagan, Extra-legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment
of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 362 (1973).
123. See infra notes 179, 194, 233–35 and accompanying text (discussing other potential
variables, noting cases with energy disputes did not reliably predict outcome, and identifying
derivative limitations).
124. Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 223, 234 (2013); see also infra note 194 (discussing difficulty of identifying
legal correctness).
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control for the merits by creating a uniform measure reflecting
125
amounts in dispute.
III. DESCRIPTIVE ARBITRATION OUTCOMES
Given the relatively limited information on ITA, some of the
most interesting questions relate to basic descriptive outcomes.
Knowing the mean and median ITA outcomes helps develop a
general portrait of how ITA operates overall. While treaties do not
necessarily permit national courts to resolve investment treaty
disputes against states, it may aid future comparisons with national
126
127
court litigation and arbitration. This section therefore explores
descriptive questions related to amounts claimed, binary outcomes
(that is, whether an investor won or lost), and relative outcomes,
including a focus on both amounts claimed and relative investor
success.
A. Amounts Claimed
128

Although a nascent literature exists, there has been a dearth of
scientific analysis of potential fiscal exposure in ITA. Without
systematic analysis, some suggest that “several pending cases involve
129
claims for billions of dollars,” while others contend “[c]laims for
130
several hundred million pounds are by no means unusual.” The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

125. See Rogers, supra note 124, at 234 (arguing “the relative strength of a particular party’s
case” serves as a control for correct outcomes).
126. U.S. litigation outcomes have been studied empirically. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429–30 (2004); Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The
Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical
Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1459–60 (2003); David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 511, 513–14 (2003). As the applicable law in U.S. courts likely involved domestic law,
rather than international law, inferences are limited.
127. See Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2011).
128. See supra notes 31–32 (identifying the existing literature).
129. Simmons, supra note 69, at 196.
130. Christoph Schreuer, Investment Arbitration: A Voyage of Discovery, 71 ARBITRATION
73, 73 (2005); see also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An
Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1400
(2003) (observing investors “alleged extensive damages” and referring to two cases).
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131

similarly stated that ITA “cases frequently involve huge claims.”
Still others suggest the economic stakes of ITA have “skyrocketed”
and warn, “‘[b]ringing a billion-dollar claim is no longer enough to
132
stand out.’”
The key question is whether the commentary
withstands systematic inquiry.
Out of the 202 cases coded, 117 contained either partial or full
quantification of investors’ claimed damage. For cases with multiple
awards articulating amounts claimed, the most recent award with a
133
fully particularized amount claimed was coded. Amounts were
converted to a common currency (U.S. dollars) and adjusted for
inflation.
The
mean
inflation-adjusted
amount
claimed
was
US$622,633,418 and the median was US$100,426,693 (n=117;
SD=2331828846). The lowest amount claimed was US$41,620.60
134
(MDL 525,834.58) in Yury Bogdanov v. Moldova, and the highest
135
amount claimed was US$19 billion in Saba Fakes v. Turkey. These
large mean claims were nearly twice the size of earlier research where
the mean claims were US$340–370 million (median of roughly US$60
136
million). The eight largest cases, with inflation-adjusted claims
exceeding US$1 billion, skewed the mean. Excluding these eight
outliers, the mean amount claimed was US$158,938,054 (median
US$86,277,549; n=109; SD=182183541). Amounts claimed in the
lowest quartile were under US$23.7 million, the second lowest
quartile ranged from US$23.7 to US$86.3 million, the second highest
131. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PUBLIC CONSULTATION: 16 May – 9 July 2012, at 62 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf [http://perma.cc/M8WG-L8VU].
132. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 22, at 14; see also Michael D. Goldhaber,
Arbitration Scorecard 2011: The Biggest Cases You Never Heard Of, AM. LAW. DAILY (July 6,
2011, 6:00 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/arbscorecard2011.html
[http://perma.cc/4X37-96FS] (“Nor is it enough to win a measly $100 million . . . . What it takes
to distinguish yourself these days is a $350 million award, minimum.”).
133. We chose this time period as we anticipated that later values in time more accurately
reflected the amount at risk. Although sometimes claims decreased, other times, claims
increased.
134. Yury Bogdanov v. Moldova, Arb. No. V 114/2009, Final Arbitral Award, at 22
(Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0096.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9AF-SDAR].
135. Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, at 3 (July 14, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/documents/Fakes_v_Turkey_Award.pdf [http://perma.cc/WJ22-8WPM].
136. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 57–59; see also Susan D. Franck, The
Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment by José E. Alvarez, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 890, 894–95 (2012) (book review) [hereinafter Franck, Alvarez Review]
(discussing earlier research).
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quartile ranged from US$86.3 to US$237.8 million, and the highest
quartile contained claims over US$237.8 million.
The results suggest that ITA involved nontrivial fiscal risk. The
data did not indicate that it takes a billion-dollar claim “to stand out.”
Rather, as the caseload increased, the number of both small and large
claims increased. Nevertheless, facial trends suggest potential
increases in amounts claimed, which warrants ongoing assessment. In
the interim, investors may discover that bringing a billion-dollar claim
could generate infamy rather than remuneration. The data reflected
that, for the eight largest claims, only one case was successful; and the
vast majority of investors bringing billion-dollar claims obtained
137
nothing. In those circumstances, states may be skeptical about the
ultimate value of one billion-dollar claims, and investors may wish to
take care to carefully substantiate their claims.
B. Binary Win Rates
Potential risk, however, is not realized risk. One of the most
basic questions in arbitration, particularly ITA, is who wins. Earlier
research, limited to pre-2007 data analyzing fifty final awards
(excluding settlements and discontinuances), indicated that investors
138
won 40% of the cases and respondents won 60%. Jose Alvarez
wrote, these “numbers pour cold water on unexamined assertions by
many critics of the [ITA] regime” that ITA exhibits a pro-investor
139
bias. The original historical snapshot analyzed fewer than sixty final
awards, and the results could have changed over time.
Backed by a nearly 300% increase in cases analyzed, the current
research replicated the proportions identified in earlier research. For
137. See Libananco Holdings Co. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award (Sep. 2,
2011); Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20; Cementownia “Nowa Huta” S.A. v.
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award (Sep. 17, 2009); Europe Cement v. Turkey,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (Aug. 13, 2009); Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sep. 9, 2008); Generation Ukr. v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/9, Award (Sep. 16, 2003); Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA, Final
Award (Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005). The only exception was Total S.A. v. Argentina,
where the amount in controversy was over US$1.2 billion, and after a finding of state liability,
an unpublished quantum award in 2013 awarded the investor damages. Total S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 31, 485 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0868.pdf [http://perma.cc/4MWE-W5P4];
Total S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, ITALAW, http://www.italaw.
com/cases/1105 [http://perma.cc/929G-QS4M] (noting that the arbitration award is not public).
138. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 49–50, 58 n.254 (2007). This excluded
two cases involving settlements. Id.
139. ALVAREZ, supra note 42, at 391.

FRANCK & WYLIE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/24/2015 4:42 PM

490

[Vol. 65:459

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
140

the 144 awards finally resolving treaty disputes, fifty-seven cases
(39.6%) were investor wins. By contrast, there were eighty-seven
cases (60.4%) where respondents won with no state liability. See
Figure 1. Chi-square analyses comparing the expected frequencies to
2
obtained frequencies demonstrated a statistical difference (χ (1)=6.25;
141
p<.05). Cohen’s conventions, the difference exhibited a small-tomedium effect (r=.21). The rough pattern was that, for every two
142
cases where investors won, states won three cases.

Percentage of Outcomes

Figure 1. Percentage of ultimate winners and losers in ITA (n=144)
100
80
60.4 %
60
40

39.6 %

20
0
Investor Wins: Award above
US$0 (n=57)

State Wins: No Award over
US$0 (n=87)

140. These figures exclude settlements or discontinuances. Of those fifteen cases, eight were
awards embodied by settlement agreements, three discontinuances involved investors
abandoning claims, three discontinuances involved respondents paying investors damages, and
one discontinuance involved a respondent paying nothing to settle the claim.
141. According to Cohen, effect sizes (r) up to .10 are “small,” .11 to .30 are “medium,” and
.31 to .50 are “large.” JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 79–80 (2d ed. 1988).
142. This is roughly analogous to recently published research. Daniel Behn, Legitimacy,
Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-theArt, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 363, 370–72 (2015) (analyzing decisions between 2011–14 to ascertain
that states won roughly 60% of cases and specifically stating “twenty-five awards declining
jurisdiction (33%), eighteen awards dismissing on the merits (24%), and thirty-four awards
upholding claims on the merits (43%)”); Schultz & Dupont, supra note 118, at 15–17
(identifying that, using a dataset of investor-state awards that included non-ITA cases, investors
won 46% of cases as compared with states by observing “investors have in fact won fewer cases
(eighty-seven in the 1972–2010 period) than host states (102 in the same period)”). Three
independent groups of researchers—analyzing somewhat similar datasets but with different
temporal periods, different scopes of ITA-related cases, and different measures—identified
similar outcome patterns, which lends credibility to the hypothesis that a “pro-investor bias” in
ITA outcomes is empirically unverifiable as a population parameter.
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This excludes cases involving settlements or discontinuances and
categorizes ultimate outcomes by (1) cases where the tribunal
awarded any damages (more than US$0) or an equivalent remedy; (2)
cases where tribunal rendered an award in the state’s favor with US$0
liability.
The stability in proportionate outcomes over time was
noteworthy. Both governments and investors were successful in ITA,
although states won in slightly larger proportions. This stability and
replication suggests earlier historical research was robust.
Those results have implications. First, the results suggest that
claims of a pro-investor bias are overstated or, at least, inaccurate in
the context of final outcomes. If such a bias existed, the data should
have revealed that investors won more than states. Instead, the results
were reversed and states won slightly more. Unlike the antidefendant
bias facially observable in the International Trade Commission’s
143
treatment of patent cases or Clermont and Eisenberg’s research
suggesting foreign plaintiffs experienced high win rates in U.S.
144
courts, ITA did not exhibit an antirespondent bias. Rather, overall
results tended to favor respondents. This is similar to UNCTAD’s
research finding that states won proportionately more cases than
145
investors.
143. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2008) (identifying that
in ITC claims, plaintiffs won 58% of cases as compared to 35% in U.S. District Court); Robert
W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of
International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 462 (2008) (reporting
“[b]etween 1975 and 1988, the complainant prevailed . . . in 65% of patent cases brought to the
ITC, compared with a 40% to 45% win rate for patent plaintiffs in federal district courts,” and
more recently “the ITC has decided 54 percent of contested cases in favor of the patent
holder”). But see MARK A. LEMLEY, THE FRACTIONING OF PATENT LAW, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 504, 506 n.14 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing
the Priest-Klein model does not apply to patent litigation as “every empirical study of patent
law . . . shows systematic variation from a 50% win rate”).
144. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1120, 1127–30 (1996) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia] (identifying
foreign plaintiffs won between 67–83% of the cases brought in U.S. courts between 1986 and
1994); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts?
Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 456–59 (2007) [hereinafter Clermont
& Eisenberg, After 9/11] (suggesting earlier research reflected a case selection effect, arguing
globalization decreased the reluctance of foreigners to litigate in U.S. courts and stating “more
standard win rates are now reasserting themselves” as foreigners were more likely to bring less
meritorious cases).
145. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies,
at 126, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2014 (June 23, 2014), http://unctad.org/en/Publications
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Second, for states considering whether to include arbitration in
treaties, the data suggest that ITA did not disfavor states. This is
perhaps unsurprising, as Eisenberg and Farber identified that
146
claimants tended to win at lower rates when suing states. As the
similarity suggests that states may have a natural advantage when
they create and participate in dispute resolution, whether in a
national or international context, states may wish to explore whether
arbitration is a viable dispute resolution option. For investors,
although they may wish to carefully assess whether to initiate claims,
the data suggest investors sometimes won.
Third, the results suggest that the Priest-Klein model of
litigation, which predicts plaintiffs generally win 50% of cases
147
irrespective of the applicable legal standards, may not apply to ITA.
The Priest-Klein model is derived from U.S. court litigation and is
based on assumptions including the application of U.S. domestic law,
clear and available precedent, and only “close” cases going to trial.
By contrast, treaties do not necessarily permit national courts to
148
149
resolve treaty disputes, ITA precedent is not always available, and
Library/wir2014_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/HN3D-BXTC] (“Of [274 known completed cases],
approximately 43 per cent were decided in favour of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the
investor. Approximately 26 per cent of cases were settled.”); see also supra note 142 (identifying
similar findings of state-dominant success in new research).
146. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569 (1989) (offering quantitative “evidence that litigating
against the government leads to lower than normal success at trial”); Theodore Eisenberg &
Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case Selection Model, 9 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 94, 96 (2003) (“[T]he plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with the
government as defendant is lower than the plaintiff win rate in job discrimination cases with
private defendants.”); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort
Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 750–52 (1988) (explaining that plaintiffs in constitutional torts cases may
bring weaker cases to trial because they are not repeat players).
147. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (1984); Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection
of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
313, 314 (1988).
148. This could, for example, derive from concerns about whether state courts resolving
disputes against the states would intentionally or unintentionally exhibit a self-serving bias. It
may also implicate (rightly or wrongly) perceived capacity to provide impartial justice. There
may also be concerns related to capacity to resolve complex international law disputes.
149. While there is a wealth of publicly available precedent, not all cases are public and they
may have only de facto rather than de jure effect. See, e.g., Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L
ARB. 129 (2007) (discussing precedent and empirically analyzing citations in ITA awards);
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 2 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 68–69 (2005)
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150

the application of precedent can be unclear. This suggests the
Priest-Klein model may not be an appropriate baseline for evaluating
the sui generis dispute settlement of international investment law.
Rather, ITA appears akin to other types of adjudication where
the process favors respondents generally or states in particular. In
those cases, the 50/50 baseline was inapposite where there were large
amounts in dispute, gaps in access to information, or where
151
settlement costs were high relative to litigation costs. Given high
152
153
claims, high arbitration costs, and information asymmetries, ITA
seems akin to adjudication where parties should expect respondents
154
to have a relative advantage. A better analogy for ITA might
155
therefore be success rates in whistleblower lawsuits, qui tam

(describing aspects of de jure and de facto precedent in ITA); Nick Gallus, Protection of NonGovernmental Organizations in Egypt Under the Egypt-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, 14
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 62, 67 (2012) (“[D]ecisions are certainly not always consistent and
a decision on the interpretation of a provision is far from a guarantee that a similar provision, or
even the same provision, will be interpreted the same way by another tribunal.”); see also Raj
Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three
Of A Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 950 (2001) (discussing lack of de jure
precedent in WTO litigation).
150. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1522.
151. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the
Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 233, 242–46 (1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 352 (1990) (noting repeat
players having greater access to information altered success rates); Keith N. Hylton,
Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33, 48 (2006)
(discussing the impact of informational asymmetries on litigation).
152. See Franck, Mediation, supra note 27, at 77–78 (providing mean data that the average
cost for lawyer fees in ITA for each party was US$5 million and the mean tribunal cost was
approximately US$1 million).
153. Developing countries may lack access to specialized counsel with inside information
related to the law of ITA or arbitration strategy. See Gottwald, supra note 86, at 250–51. Small
investors who are not repeat players may experience similar information gaps.
154. But see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 423–24 (2010)
(discussing a high detainee win rate in a small number of litigated habeas cases involving
Guantanamo detainees).
155. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later,
64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (identifying that less than 10% of employee whistleblowing
claims before administrative agencies under Sarbanes-Oxley were successful); Richard E.
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007) (same); Nancy M. Modesitt,
Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of State Court Cases, 62 U.
KAN. L. REV. 165, 180–82 (2013) (identifying a 24% win rate for whistleblowers in a sample of
34 cases).
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litigation, Bivens lawsuits against government officials for violations
157
of citizens’ U.S. constitutional rights, citizen complaints against
158
159
civil- or prisoner-rights cases,
or medicalagency action,
160
malpractice litigation. These cases share other similarities with ITA,
as they involve claims by individuals, claims against a state, claims
related to improper regulatory activity, or claims seeking fiscal
compensation.
C. Amounts Awarded and Relative Investor Success
As a binary metric masks nuance, ITA outcomes should also be
assessed using more sensitive measures. When considering amounts
awarded or relative investor success, investors experienced some
success, but states obtained relatively more success.
Including settlements, there were 159 cases where ITA tribunals
made awards that resulted in a damage determination. There were
101 cases where investors were awarded nothing at the conclusion of
the dispute, whether by virtue of a tribunal damage award, settlement
161
agreement or discontinuance. For the remaining 58 cases, awards
reflected a damage award or respondent’s agreement to pay damages
156. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from
Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1288–90, 1296, 1299, 1306, 1319–20 (2012)
(observing an overall win rate of approximately 28% and identifying that critical variables
affecting outcomes involved the experience of lawyers).
157. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827–30, 839–46 (2010) (observing that
30% of Bivens claims succeeded through settlement or merits disposition, disproving assertions
that those claims typically lack merit and burden the federal judiciary, and arguing that
normative approaches based upon faulty empirical assessments are improper).
158. See Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 249 (2012) (identifying that citizen petitions to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration to take action on drug safety were successful only 19% of the time); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1099 (2008)
(identifying agency win-rates were generally over 70%).
159. See Eisenberg, supra note 146, at 1578–80 (identifying success rates of civil rights,
employment discrimination, and prisoner civil-rights litigation cases were far below reported
trial success rates for other litigation and typically below 50%).
160. See Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. BULL., at 4 (Nov. 2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf [http://
perma.cc/W5B8-LVX5] (finding plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases had a win rate of less
than 25% in tort trials and jury trials); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice
Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1126 (2006)
(finding medical malpractice plaintiffs lost 70% or more cases and questioning applicability of
the Priest-Klein model in medical malpractice).
161. This included discontinuances and settlements that did not create fiscal liability.
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162

Put simply, even
through settlement and/or discontinuance.
including known settlements, investors obtained damages in less than
half the cases.
For all cases, investors obtained a mean award of US$16.6
million and a median award of US$0. Investors’ relative success in
final cases reflected a mean success rate of 18%, but a median 2%
success rate. See Table 1. Both measures of central tendency
demonstrate that investors obtained awards of 2–18¢ for each dollar
claimed. The results may reflect large standard deviations, outliers,
and variation in the ITA caseload.
Focusing on the subset cases where investors obtained an award
minimizes variance. Table 1 reflects the mean amount awarded was
US$45.6 million and the median was US$10.9 million. The amount
claimed for cases involving claimant success was not as extreme as the
overall sample, and the mean amounts claimed decreased by
163
approximately one-third. As tribunals weeded out unmeritorious or
inflated claims, investors obtaining damage awards fared better.
Relative to their requests, Table 1 reflects that successful investors
obtained a mean of 35% and a median of 27% of requested damages.
For the roughly 40% of investors obtaining damages, they secured
roughly 30% of their claimed damage.
Table 1: Outcomes as a Function of Inflation-Adjusted Amounts
Awarded (in U.S. Dollars) and Relative Investor Success Comparing
Amounts Claimed to Amounts Awarded
Outcome Variable
Amount Awarded
(All Cases)

Mean
16,623,986

Median
0

SD
16623986

n
159

18.00%

1.86%

26.04

103

Amount Awarded – Subset of Investor Wins

45,572,651

10,866,790

68283499

58

Relative Investor Success – Subset of
Investor Wins

34.98%

28.69%

26.92

53

Relative Investor Success
(All Cases)

162. Only two cases created a settlement or discontinuance requiring a payment: Goetz v.
Burundi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award (Feb. 10, 1999) (reflecting agreement to pay
US$2,989,636), and Impregilo v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Order of Discontinuance
of the Proceeding (Sept. 25, 2005) (reflecting agreement to pay US$98,000,000).
163. For the subset, investors claimed an average amount of US$171,326,467 and a median
amount of US$87,156,098 (n=53; SD=191861066).
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The results are facially disparate from amounts awarded, for
164
or medical malpractice
example, in employment arbitration
165
litigation, where claimants were generally awarded less than one
million dollars on average. Those results may reflect the relative
value of claims involving individuals applying established legal
principles rather than multinational investments operating under
complex regulatory regimes in multiple languages with unsettled legal
principles.
A better analogy for understanding outcomes in ITA involves
amounts awarded and relative success of foreign claimants litigating
in domestic courts. One might posit that domestic courts privilege
domestic entities and penalize foreigners; and thus, ITA provides an
alternative to promote the neutral application of legal principles. At
least historically, however, foreigners were not disenfranchised by
litigating in U.S. courts. Initially, Clermont and Eisenberg identified
that foreigners suing domestic entities in U.S. courts did well; and for
166
those cases, the median award exceeded the median demand. This
was not the pattern for ITA outcomes. Rather, outcomes were
facially akin to those of U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign defendants in
U.S. courts. In those cases, domestic entities typically recovered half

164. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 127, at 5, 7 (identifying mean award of US$109,858 and
median damages of US$36,500); Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 DISP.
RESOL. J. 44, 57 (2003) (finding a mean damage award of US$236,292 and a median award of
US$100,000); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 50 (2003) (finding mean damages of
US$211,720 and US$32,500 for arbitration disputes brought by high paid employees for
noncivil-rights and civil-rights claims, and median damages of US$98,984 and US$32,500);
Oppenheimer, supra note 126, at 438–39 (2005) (identifying a median damage award of
US$296,991).
165. Hyman & Silver, supra note 160, at 1110 (stating mean medical malpractice payments
were approximately US$300,000 and, while the number of US$1 million claims increased, mean
payment sizes over US$1 million did not increase over time); Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A.
Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 356,
369 (2012) (indicating average verdicts for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases
was US$142,000 and US$328,000 for economic damages); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 451–52 (2005)
(identifying, over time, that medical malpractice awards averaged from roughly US$250,000–
530,000 and plaintiff success rates ranged roughly from 23–27%).
166. See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia, supra note 144, at 1141–42 (identifying that the
median demand was US$73,155 but the median award was US$1,061,064 for foreigners suing
domestic entities, and also identifying that the mean demand was US$913,198 and the mean
award was US$1,061,064).
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of their demand, as “cases against foreigners are characterized by
big demands, but not big awards. This pattern suggests a blustering
168
plaintiff with a lower chance of winning.” In any event, foreign
plaintiffs’ success in U.S. courts has changed over time. As
globalization decreased concerns of xenophobia, Clermont and
Eisenberg’s post-9/11 research indicates that, more recently,
foreigners have brought marginally weaker cases and their success
169
levels have also decreased. If ITA follows this pattern, case
selection effects could lead to investor success levels decreasing over
time as ITA diffuses, the docket expands, and the risk of pursuing
170
claims decreases.
Overall, ITA outcomes reflected wide variation but a general
pattern. The pattern exhibited less investor success than some
commentators suggest and minimal evidence of pro-investor bias.
Instead, the data provided initial evidence of a pro-state bias that was
similar to cases in U.S. litigation involving claims against state
entities. The results also may reflect a case selection effect where
possibly the most meritorious cases are resolved before initiating ITA
or nonmeritorious claims are not pursued. Given variation in the
results, it is constructive to explore variables affecting case disposition
and its use as a “shadow” for negotiating alternative outcomes.
IV. MODELING OUTCOMES: REGRESSION ANALYSES
The descriptive baseline of amounts claimed and outcomes
provides a starting point for understanding ITA. Yet, it does not
explain the variation in outcomes. Scholarship has not yet identified
meaningful links between ITA outcomes and respondent state171
172
development status, presiding arbitrator background, whether an
167. Id. (observing that domestic entities suing foreigners exhibited less success with a
median demand of US$223,494 and median award of US$129,267 and observing that the mean
demand was US$2,045,194 and the mean award was US$1,398,520).
168. Id. at 1141.
169. Clermont & Eisenberg, After 9/11, supra note 144, at 451, 453, 463–64.
170. The opposite might also occur. Should investors become more risk averse at bringing
claims given low levels of success and/or third-party funders make it difficult to obtain funding
to pursue the expensive ITA process, it is possible that only the most serious claims with the
best chance of success would be pursued. Should that occur, investors’ success could increase as
less meritorious claims never become formalized.
171. Franck, Development, supra note 32, at 439–40.
172. Id. Compare Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 23, 32 (suggesting the political preferences
and repeat appointments of arbitrators are linked to ITA including “[a]rbitrators from
developing countries are less likely to hold the host country liable because they are more
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energy dispute was involved, the presence of a Latin American state,
173
or whether ITA occurs at ICSID or elsewhere. Existing research has
also not explored the effects of over two independent variables
174
simultaneously. This may reflect ITA’s historically small caseload
that makes multiple regression analyses challenging and the lack of a
175
theoretical framework.
This section therefore expands upon existing research by
exploring how additional variables and different models affect ITA
outcomes. It does so by first identifying the type of modeling used.
Next, we tested two paradigms—namely a case-based and arbitratorvenue based model—as explanations of ITA outcomes. We tested
both paradigms using amounts awarded (which used a zero-inflated
two-part model to test for differences between those cases with and
without a US$0 award) and relative investor success. Finally, we
combined the significant predictors from earlier models to create a
third hybrid model, which was able to reliably predict ITA outcomes
using relative investor success.
First, methodologically, we estimated separate regression models
176
with SAS PROC GLIMMIX using maximum likelihood estimation
for each dependent variable. Continuous variables were centered at
177
their mean. For categorical variables with multiple levels, we

familiar with the economic and social conditions in developing countries and host countries the
more likely source of future arbitral appointments”), with Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment, supra
note 32, at 80–85 (exploring ITA outcomes as a function of the decisions of “elite” arbitrators
and finding a lack of relationship). See also Kapeliuk, Games, supra note 32, at 296, 311
(exploring repeat appointments and panel experience on ITA outcomes).
173. Franck, ICSID, supra note 32, at 833.
174. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (identifying that research historically focused
on two independent variables and the interaction effect); supra note 41 and accompanying text
(providing more sophisticated analysis by controlling for Polity IV). But see Waibel & Wu,
supra note 82, at 26–40 (providing preliminary unpublished results on various models affecting
net outcomes but focusing on arbitrator identity).
175. See supra notes 36, 42 and accompanying text; Rogers, supra note 124, at 228.
176. SAS is a statistical software package, and the SAS PROC GLIMMIX is the statistical
software procedure that fits models to non-normal data using a generalized linear mixed model.
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation is appropriate for data that are non-continuous (that is,
binary outcomes) and residuals that are not normally distributed (that is, many zero outcomes
and skewness). ML uses the normal distribution to estimate parameters (using a series of
iterations to find the most likely mean that produced the data), whereas Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) estimation finds the best fitting line by minimizing the squared residuals to find
parameter estimates.
177. Continuous variables were centered at their mean: Polity IV score (M=5.27);
Claimant’s legal team (M=2.05); Respondent’s legal team (M=3.36); and the Chair’s weighted
experience as a repeat player (M=2.23).
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dummy coded using the first variable listed serving as the reference
group. Parameter estimates for each of the separate models are
presented in Tables 2 to 6.
Next, given our interest in exploring alternative paradigms and
178
extralegal factors, we initially examined two groups of variables.
Under one paradigm, ITA outcomes are a function of the case itself,
which could reflect a case selection effect influencing disputes
179
pursued through ITA and ultimate results. Under this model, party
180
181
identity is crucial. Given claims of pro-investor bias, examining

178. Because of sample size and degrees of freedom, we examined variables in two different
paradigms. This permitted examination of more independent variables while testing competing
ideas of what predicts outcomes (that is, case-related or tribunal-related variables).
179. There may be other case-related variables, like sector involved or type of government
activity generating the dispute, which could influence outcomes. Jeremy Caddel and Nathan
Jensen’s preliminary research distinguishing among state actors generating disputes—namely
executive branch, legislatures, subnational activity, state-owned firms, other agencies or
courts—relies upon a sui generis classification system. Since their research identified that most
disputes involved executive branch conduct, it is unclear whether this variable would contribute
meaningful variance. See Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which Host Country
Government Actors Are Most Involved With Disputes With Foreign Investors?, COLUM. FDI
PERSP., No. 120 (Apr. 28, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-120-Caddel-andJensen-FINAL-WEBSITE-version.pdf [http://perma.cc/KSA4-H3R3]. There is large variance in
industries involved in ITA. Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 32, at 41–43.
Hypothesizing energy disputes generate a core proportion of ITA disputes and involve large
claims, we explored whether there was a reliable difference between energy and non-energy
disputes. We were unable to identify reliable differences in outcomes related to energy disputes
2
when analyzing (1) whether investors won or lost and using a Chi-Square Test (χ (1)=0.843,
p=.36, r=.08, n=144), (2) inflation-adjusted amounts awarded in all disputes using an MannWhitney two-sample U-test (U=2120.0, Z=-1.513, p=.13, n=144), (3) relative investor success in
all disputes using a t-test (t(101)=-1.528, p=.13, r=.15, n=103), or (4) relative investor success in
the subset of cases where investors won using a t-test (t(51)=-0.35, p=.73, r=.05, n=53). Only a
Mann-Whitney U-test of inflation-adjusted amounts awarded using the subset of cases where
investors won identified a meaningful difference between amounts awarded for energy and nonenergy disputes (U=239, Z=-2.034, p=.04, r=.12, n=58). The median energy dispute involved
higher awards (US$41,780,026; IQR=6,438,771-113,451,356) than the median non-energy
dispute (US$8,000,918; IQR=2,961,702-26,540,200). Although fiscal amounts were visually stark,
the effect size was statistically small when using Cohen’s threshold for interpreting effect sizes.
The non-significant results replicated earlier research providing initial evidence that could not
distinguish between outcomes for energy and non-energy cases. Franck, ICSID, supra note 32,
at 863–66. As analyses involving energy disputes generated non-significant variance and small
effect sizes, we did not use this variable. With the lack of statistical power, as the population of
ITA awards expands, a latent effect could become observable. Whenever we added the energy
variable to case-based models, all models became non-significant. This suggests caution for
using energy as an explanatory variable.
180. Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2260, 2264–65 (2013); Simmons, supra
note 69, at 198; Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under the
Shadow of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively,
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investor identity is necessary. The case-based model therefore
examines two different measures of investor identity. One variable
identified whether the named claimants in the case were all humans,
182
all corporate entities, or some combination thereof. A second
variable explored whether the Financial Times ranked any of the
named investors as an elite multinational in its top five hundred
183
global companies (i.e. a FT500 corporation).
The case-based model also examined the background of states
involved in ITA. As concerns of unfair treatment of developing states
184
are arguably conflated with a host state’s democracy levels, the
model explored three types of respondent-related identity variables.
One variable used the World Bank’s four-category classification of
state’s development status to identify what level of development the
185
state exhibited. A second variable identified a state’s democracy
186
levels using the Polity IV index. Finally, as a core proportion of the

the Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L 3, 19 (2010); see also Danny J. Boggs, Reining in Judges:
The Case of Hate Speech, 52 SMU L. REV. 271, 271 (1999) (exploring the theory of party identity
on litigation outcomes); Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 465, 491–92 (1996) (noting, in the context of U.S. federal litigation, primary theories of
extra-legal factors affecting outcomes could either be party identity or venue).
181. See supra notes 21, 40, 80–82, 139; infra note 197; see also Rogers, supra note 124, at 262
(observing that critics suggest party identity affects outcome).
182. As this measure of investor identity involves a three-category variable, two dummy
variables analyzed group differences with cases only involving human beings as the reference
group. For the subset of final awards; 14.5% (n=23) of cases involved claims only by human
beings; 78.6% (n=125) involved claims brought exclusively by corporate entities; and 6.9%
(n=11) of cases involved claims brought by a combination of investors who were people and
corporate entities.
183. For final awards, 7.5% (n=12) involved cases where at least one of the named investors
was a FT500 entity whereas 92.5% (n=147) of cases did not involve even one FT500 entity.
184. See, e.g., Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 55–64, 68–69.
185. The four categories were high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and
low income. Dummy variables analyzed differences across categories with high income as the
reference group.
186. Recognizing classifications could change over time, state development status and Polity
IV were coded using the award date. Polity IV is designed to identify the political regime of a
state. Polity contains information on countries with a population of more than 500,000 people.
The index places states on a scale in which states with more authoritarian and autocratic
regimes have lower Polity scores, and states with more democratic regimes have higher scores.
See Polity IV Project: Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013, CTR. FOR
SYSTEMIC PEACE & INTEGRATED NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [http://perma.cc/6U5B-PVD4] (last updated
June 6, 2014); The Polity Project: About Polity, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE & INTEGRATED
NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.
html [http://perma.cc/U2BC-SVWY] (last updated 2014). Coding in this Article used 2012
scores prior to the release of the 2013 Polity IV data.
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caseload derived from Argentina’s 2001 currency crisis, we used a
variable identifying whether Argentina was the respondent to assess a
188
potential “Argentina effect.” The objective was to understand the
generalizability of inferences about one key state’s experiences.
Building on Marc Galanter’s classic scholarship that repeat
189
players (RPs) have strategic advantages in dispute resolution and
suggestions that the effects of RPs may be acute in international
190
arbitration, the case-based model evaluated the expertise of parties’
counsel. After coding all counsel of record in every award,
irrespective of whether counsel were in-house or external and
irrespective of which side counsel represented, we identified 420
191
192
different legal entities involved in representing parties in ITA. As
approximately 75% of the known legal entities involved in
representing parties in ITA were only involved in a single case, we
generated a variable reflecting each legal entity’s relative expertise to
indicate whether they were a one-shot player or RP with varying
193
levels of sophistication. Then, as parties often had multiple teams of
187. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CASELOAD–STATISTICS (Issue
2012-1) 13 (2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/20121%20%20-%20English.pdf [http://perma.cc/94UU-9NKX] (identifying ICSID’s overall caseload
but separating cases against Argentina).
188. Franck, Alvarez Review, supra note 136, at 896.
189. Galanter, supra note 86, at 97; see also Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on
the Scale of Law and its Users, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1387–89 (2006) (providing an overview of
potential advantages held by RPs).
190. See supra note 86; see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 19
(1999) (examining the applicability of Galanter’s arguments about comparative advantages in
arbitration).
191. Given varieties in tribunals’ procedures for identifying counsel, legal entities were the
unit of analysis. Legal entities were external law firms, barristers’ chambers, business units, and
government departments. Individuals, like Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, were only coded as
distinct legal entities when s/he had no other formal affiliation. Counsel were primarily
identified using the award cover page or descriptions as to who appeared in hearings. This
creates a risk the coding did not fully reflect lawyers who silently assist or ghost-write. As law
firms have incentives to serve as counsel of record, control proceedings, and participate in
hearings, this risk could be small.
192. RPs were identified using entities named in awards as parties’ counsel of record.
193. The underlying assumption was, where firms have a larger number of cases, they will
have a higher level of sophistication and expertise in ITA, and therefore they deserved a higher
ranking to reflect a greater relative expertise. We used the distribution of legal entities within
the data itself to generate break-points. For those legal entities with a single appointment, they
were ranked as “0” to reflect their status as one-shot players. The distribution indicated that, at
the 90th percentile, a legal entity had an average of 3.9 cases. For that reason, RPs involved in
two to four cases were ranked as “1.” The next clear break occurred at the 95th percentile,
where attorneys’ average number of cases was 6.95 with a meaningful cluster of entities having
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lawyers, for each team representing the investor, we generated a
composite variable reflecting the net legal sophistication of all entities
representing the investor. We repeated this exercise for states to
identify the net relative expertise of their legal counsel.
Should the case-based model be significant, it could purely
reflect a case selection effect whereby investors and their counsel
choose to pursue particularly meritorious (or unmeritorious) claims.
The results can also illuminate the variables that may be causally
proximate, or serve as proxies, for reliably predicting ITA outcomes.
In either event, knowing whether the case-based model contributes to
outcomes provides information stakeholders can use to assess
whether ITA outcomes were random or if certain variables
194
contributed to arbitration risk that states may wish to minimize.
Under a second paradigm, ITA outcomes derive from
characteristics of the arbitrators, tribunal composition, and the venue
of the dispute. Irrespective of whether ITA arbitrators are viewed as
195
part of the problem or part of the solution, arbitrator identity is
196
frequently used to explain ITA outcomes. Drawing on literature

5–6 cases; for that reason, RPs with five to six cases were ranked as “2.” Thereafter, there were
twenty-one legal entities remaining. The next clear break occurred for the twelve entities that
were in the bottom portion of that group, and those RPs with seven to nine cases were ranked
as “3.” Finally, the remaining top nine RPs, namely those with eleven or more cases, were coded
as “4.” The individual values for each legal entity were then added to all the other values of
other legal entities (if any) representing a party to create a single “legal team” measure for both
claimants and respondents. We used a binary definition of RPs to assess robustness. See infra
note 211.
194. Although another case-model variable would be a case’s legal merits, we previously
explored the difficulty of identifying legal correctness. See supra notes 123–24, 149 and
accompanying text; see also Gallus, supra note 149, at 67 (“[D]ecisions are certainly not always
consistent and a decision on the interpretation of a provision is far from a guarantee that a
similar provision, or even the same provision, will be interpreted the same way by another
tribunal.”); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: Arbitration Without Legitimacy,
AM. LAW. LITIG. DAILY (June 7, 2013), http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202603368340/
The-Global-Lawyer-Arbitration-Without-Legitimacy [http://perma.cc/3BV7-XUFL] (quoting
Catherine Rogers’s statement that “no study can control for the correct legal outcome”). Others
struggle with addressing legal correctness of ITA outcomes. Rogers, supra note 124, at 234 n.42
(noting that Waibel and Wu attempted to control for a case’s strength and legal correctness “by
having those challenges assessed by a panel of reputable investment arbitration specialists” after
the dispute was decided). Such an approach, however, generates a risk of hindsight bias.
195. See Rogers, supra note 124, at 226–28 (identifying competing narratives about how ITA
arbitrators generate serious problems in ITA or provide a valuable service).
196. Brekoulakis, supra note 24, at 4; Chiara Giorgetti, Is the Truth in the Eyes of the
Beholder? The Perils and Benefits of Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration,
12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 263, 265 (2014); see supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of concerns about ITA.
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197

about ideological affiliations of U.S. judges, some commentators
focus on the influence of arbitrators’ personal characteristics on
198
199
outcome. Related variables include arbitrator gender, the number
200
of appointments, and attributes of tribunal chairs who serve as
201
potential swing votes. The tribunal-based model therefore explored
several tribunal-focused variables. First, as it was rare for ITA
202
tribunals to have two or more women, gender was a binary variable
that solely differentiated between tribunals with at least one female
member and all-male tribunals. Second, another variable
differentiated between arbitrators’ development status on the basis of
how the World Bank classified the development level of the state of

197. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN &
ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006). In ITA, ideological divides do not involve traditional liberal-conservative
divides, as it is not a uniform transnational concept (i.e. UK conservatives could be liberals in
the USA); rather, ideological dynamics involve “pro-state” preference for state sovereignty or
“pro-investor” preference for protecting property rights. Giorgetti, supra note 196, at 268;
Rogers, supra note 124, at 238–39; Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 21–22.
198. See George Kahale III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?, 9 TRANSNAT’L DISP.
MGMT., no. 7, Dec. 2012, at 3 (“[E]xperienced practitioners too often can predict the outcome of
[ITA] based upon the composition of the tribunal.”); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 6–7, 9–11,
35–37 (exploring extralegal factors effecting ITA decisions and identifying that developing
world arbitrators were more likely to confirm jurisdiction than developed world arbitrators).
Waibel and Wu offered a granular analysis of arbitrator background, including legal system of
origin (including common and civil law), graduation from “elite” law schools (defined as
training only from Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Oxford or Cambridge), and experience as
practitioners, government officials, or judges. Id. at 27–28.
199. See Giorgetti, supra note 196, at 265–66 n.7, 270–71 (reviewing research identifying the
lack of women in ITA); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 34 (identifying female arbitrators were
more likely to affirm jurisdiction decisions but were unrelated to ultimate outcomes); id. at 38
(failing to find a significant relationship with chair gender and jurisdiction or liability).
200. Kapeliuk, Repeat Appointment, supra note 32, at 68, 79–89; Waibel & Wu, supra note
82, at 22.
201. See generally Franck, Development, supra note 32 (discussing factors affecting tribunal
outcomes); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, 31–32 (focusing on the political preferences and repeat
appointments of arbitrators to predict ITA outcomes). See also Kahale, supra note 198, at 4–6
(suggesting party appointments drive outcomes); Maupin, supra note 40, at 386 (“[C]ritics
contend that a systemic bias extends to presiding arbitrators as well—the crucial swing vote . . . .
[B]ecause all three arbitrators are paid by the disputing parties, and only investors (not states)
can initiate arbitration proceedings, presiding arbitrators who wish to safeguard the possibility
of future investor-state arbitration appointments have an incentive to ensure that investors
win.”). As both parties can appoint one arbitrator and all arbitrators must be impartial, legal
regulation theoretically decreases risk of bias.
202. Out of the 247 arbitrators, only nine arbitrators were women. As female arbitrators had
repeat appointments, for final awards, 15.7% (n=25) of tribunals included at least one woman.
The remaining 84.3% (n=134) of tribunals contained only men. See also supra note 121.
THE
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their nationality. Third, a variable distinguished between chairs’
relative expertise and explored how often chairs had repeat
204
205
appointments. Finally, given claims that ICSID is a biased forum,
the model explored arbitration venue and looked for differences
between cases administered at ICSID and those administered
elsewhere (that is, cases at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or
ad hoc arbitrations).
To assess the two models of explaining ITA outcomes, the
research analyzed the dependent variables of amounts awarded and
relative success. In light of the number of predictors of interest and
the sample size, testing the two models separately permitted
assessment of a greater number of potential predictors. We also used
a hybrid model, combining significant case-based and tribunal-venuebased variables, to assess whether case-based variables remained
predictive.
A. Amounts Awarded
We estimated a zero-inflated two-part model based on adaptive
quadrature to examine whether our hypothesized variables predicted
amounts awarded. This procedure allows estimation of dependent
variables with semicontinuous data that contain multiple zeros and
right-skewed distribution of positive values, including amounts
awarded where many cases had a US$0 award and the remainder of
206
the awards exhibited positive skewing. The first part of the model
203. Nationals from high-income states dominated the arbitrators deciding ITA disputes. It
was rare for arbitrators to be nationals of upper-middle income, lower-middle income or low
income states. We created a three-level categorical variable reflecting the combined total for the
development background of the tribunal including (1) tribunals composed exclusively of all
high-income arbitrators, (2) tribunals composed of two high -income arbitrators and one
developing-country arbitrator; and (3) tribunals composed of one high-income arbitrator and
two developing-country arbitrators. Given the small number (under seven) of ITA tribunals
composed exclusively of developing country arbitrators, this was not the focus of analysis.
204. Repeat-player arbitrators were identified using all 272 awards in the dataset. Of those
248 different arbitrators, 58.9% were appointed once. The weighted variable for arbitrators was
constructed similarly to the weighted variables for the expertise of parties’ legal teams. See
supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. We used the distribution of appointments within the
data to generate break-points. Arbitrators who were one-shot players were coded as “0.”
Arbitrators with 2–3 cases (in the 60–82th percentile) were coded as “1”; arbitrators with 4–6
cases (in the 83–91st percentile) were coded as “2,” arbitrators with 7–8 cases (in the 92–95th
percentile) were coded as “3,” and those arbitrators with more than 9 cases (top 4%) were
coded as “4.”
205. Trakman, TPP, supra note 15, at 14–15.
206. When zero values indicate the absence of an occurrence, rather than the lowest number
of a continuum, it is improper to treat zeros as a point on the continuum; zeros must therefore
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values zeros (US$0 awards) using a binary logit distribution and the
second part models positive continuous data with a lognormal
distribution. Although the models have separate regression weights,
207
the models are estimated simultaneously. Functionally, the initial
zero-model is roughly equivalent to a predictive model for a binary
win/loss dependent variable as it seeks to predict whether an investor
secured any fiscal award, irrespective of the actual amount. In
contrast, the continuous model focuses more upon the absolute
degree of remuneration.
Table 2 reflects the results for the regression model for the casebased approach. Both regression models, namely the zero model
[F(10,182)=2.55, p<.01, n=94] and the continuous model
[F(10,182)=4.71, p<.001, n=55], significantly predicted amounts
208
awarded in ITA disputes. There was a medium effect size (r =.34)
accounting for 12% of the variance.
Within the zero model, the identity of an investor and the
claimant’s legal team’s prior experience significantly predicted
whether there was an amount awarded. The role of investor identity,
however, was complicated. The zero-model suggested that, when the
claimant was a corporation (as opposed to a human being), then
amounts awarded were more likely to be a zero (that is, a non-award
and determination of no state liability); in contrast, human beings
were more likely to be awarded some dollar amount. If none of the
named investors in a case were classified as a FT500 corporation,
outcomes were more likely to be a non-award; but, when at least one
of the named investors was a FT500 entity, then the case was more
209
likely to result in state liability. When viewing ITA from the
be analyzed separately from continuous values. Kevin L. Delucchi & Alan Bostrom, Methods
for Analysis of Skewed Data Distributions in Clinical Studies: Working With Many Zero Values,
161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1159, 1159, 1161–66 (2004).
207. These models are widely accepted in quantitative studies in criminology, economics,
political science and sociology. David C. Atkins & Robert J. Gallop, Rethinking How Family
Researchers Model Infrequent Outcomes: A Tutorial on Count Regression and Zero Inflated
Models, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 726, 726–34 (2007).
208. Because r-values are not readily available using two-part models, r was calculated for
both models simultaneously by estimating the correlation of the predicted outcomes and the
expected outcomes.
209. We looked further into named investors’ corporate chain to explore whether investors’
direct parent companies were FT500 entities. Where any of the named investors or a direct
parent was listed on the FT500, this was coded as the case involving a FT500 entity; all other
cases were coded as non-FT500 cases. For the subset of final awards, 8.8% (n=14) of cases
involved a case where at least one investor (or a parent) was listed on the FT500; and for the
remaining 91.2% (n=145) cases, none of the named investors or their immediate corporate
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perspective of human beings initiating claims, people fared relatively
well; but viewing investor identity from the perspective of whether
they were large multinational investors, large investors fared
relatively well. These dual perspectives are not necessarily
inconsistent as they reflect different systemic experiences of
210
investors. Both variables reflected that investor identity contributed
meaningfully to ITA outcomes, albeit in different ways. In addition,
only for the claimant’s legal team, the less experienced the claimant’s
legal team, the more likely the amounts awarded were a non-award.
The more experienced the claimant’s legal team, the more likely the
211
investor would obtain some form of recovery.
Within the continuous model, there were two significant
predictors. The experience of claimant’s legal team continued to be a
critical variable of amounts awarded. Once again, where an investor’s
legal team exhibited more experience, the amount awarded to the
investor also increased. In addition, although it was the only time our
models indicated a state’s development status was a significant
212
predictor of outcome, the continuous model identified a link with a
parent(s) were FT500 entities. We used this broader conception of investor identity to analyze
whether this construction of investor identity was a meaningful predictor of outcomes and to
assess whether the initial FT500 definition was a robust predictor. For both the zero and
continuous models, expanding FT500 to look at the corporate chain did not alter significance
tests outcomes (zero model: B=-2.13, SE=0.79, t=-2.70, p<.01; continuous model: B=-0.86,
SE=0.52, t=1.66, p=0.10). The predictive ability of the models also did not change (zero model:
[F(10,182)=2.64, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(10,182)=4.97, p<.001]; r=.33).
210. We observe that both groups were relatively small. When focusing on investor identity,
cases involving only people were less than 16% of final awards, whereas cases involving at least
one FT500 investor were less than 8% of final awards. See supra notes 182–83 and
accompanying text.
211. We created another binary variable for identifying whether attorneys were RPs. As
identified in text accompanying footnotes 192–93, 75% of all legal entities in ITA were one-shot
players and coded as “0” to reflect their failure to act as RPs. Those legal entities involved in
multiple ITA cases were coded as “1,” irrespective of how many cases they were involved with
and whether the representation had involved the investor, state or both. Using those raw binary
codes, we then created a composite variable for each party to generate the total sum of RPs on
each party’s legal team. For both the zero and continuous models, changing the definition of RP
counsel to a binary, instead of a weighted, measure did not change the results. The case-based
models remained significant; and while the expertise of claimant’s counsel was a significant
predictor for both the zero and continuous models (zero model: B=-0.77, SE=0.29, t=-2.62,
p<0.01; continuous model: B=0.63, SE=0.27, t=2.34, p<0.05), the expertise of respondent’s
counsel was not a significant predictor for either model (zero model: B=0.04, SE=0.09, t=0.43,
p=.67; continuous model: B=0.08, SE=0.08, t=0.96, p=0.34). The predictive ability of the models
also did not change (zero model: [F(10,182)=2.41, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(10,182)=4.23,
p<.001]; r=.33).
212. We examined two additional measures of respondent development status: how the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) scored the respondent state’s Human
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state’s World Bank status and
income states (as compared to
213
higher amounts awarded. No
predictors of amounts awarded
214
continuous model.

507

amounts awarded: upper-middle
high-income states) experienced
other variables were significant
in ITA for either the zero or

Development Index (HDI) and whether the state was a member of the OECD. When the model
substituted HDI and OECD for the World Bank classification, neither significantly predicted
outcome nor otherwise altered model parameters. This was true for both the HDI measure
(zero model: B=1.76, SE=2.07, t=0.85, p=0.40; continuous model: B=0.77, SE=2.42, t=0.32,
p=0.75) and the OECD measure (zero model: B=0.06, SE=0.49, t=-0.12, p=0.91; continuous
model: B=-0.23, SE=0.02, t=-0.42, p=0.67). For HDI, the predictive ability of the models also did
not change (zero model: [F(8,184)=3.00, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(8,184)=4.95, p<.001];
r=.33). For OECD, the predictive ability of the models also did not change (zero model:
[F(8,186)=2.98, p<.01]; continuous model: [F(8,186)=4.96, p<.001]; r=.33).
213. Recent research demonstrated a meaningful difference in amounts awarded, where
upper-middle income states experienced larger amounts awarded when compared with high
income states. Franck, Conflating, supra note 41, at 48 fig.2 (demonstrating broader variance in
amounts awarded against upper-middle income states, but smaller variance in awards against
high-income, lower-middle and low income states). No other models, using either HDI or
OECD scores, revealed a meaningful difference in amounts awarded; and once a respondent
state’s internal democracy scores were controlled for, all models analyzed could not generate a
meaningful link to a respondent’s development status. Id. at 57–58 tbls. 8 & 9. The World Bank
always classified Argentina as an upper-middle state; and, for the zero model, the presence of
Argentina was close to significant (p=.10).
214. Some variables in the zero-model were approaching significance. For states, World
Bank classification (high income versus mid-high income; and high income versus low income),
had a p-value of .09 and .07, respectively. The presence of Argentina was also potentially linked
to amounts awarded. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. None of the other variables in
the continuous models approached significance.
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Table 2: Case-related Two Part Regression Model Predicting Amounts
Awarded
Variable

B

SE

t

p

Intercept

1.01

0.77

1.32

0.19

Investor Type
(0 = human being, 1 = corporation)

1.08

0.54

2.01

0.05*

Investor Type
(0 = human being,
1 = corporation and human being)

1.55

1.97

1.29

0.20

FT500 Corporation
(0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation,
1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation)

-2.43

0.93

-2.60

<0.01**

Claimant Attorney Experience

-0.31

0.11

-2.91

<0.01**

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent upper-middle income state)

-1.18

0.69

-1.71

0.09

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent lower-middle income state)

-1.13

0.73

-1.54

0.13

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent low income state)

-1.77

0.95

-1.85

0.07

Respondent Polity IV Score

0.03

0.03

1.08

0.28

Argentina
(0 = Respondent was not Argentina,
1 = Respondent was Argentina)

-1.21

0.73

-1.65

0.10

Respondent Attorney Experience

0.04

0.09

0.45

0.65

Continuous Model
13.93

0.85

16.39

<0.001***

Zero Model

Intercept

Investor Type
(0 = human being, 1 = corporation)

0.73

0.57

1.28

0.20

Investor Type
(0 = human being,
1 = corporation & human being)

1.09

1.53

0.71

0.48

FT500 Corporation
(0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation,
1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation)

0.63

0.55

1.15

0.25
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B
0.27

SE
0.10

t
2.86

P
<0.01**

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent upper-middle income state)

1.61

0.81

1.98

<0.05*

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent lower-middle income state)

1.34

0.83

1.62

0.11

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent low income state)

0.80

0.98

0.82

0.41

Respondent Polity Score

-0.03

0.02

-1.53

0.13

Argentina
(0 = Respondent was not Argentina,
1 = Respondent was Argentina)

0.82

0.59

1.40

0.16

Respondent Attorney Experience

0.06

0.08

0.48

0.48

Zero model, F(10,182)=2.55, p<.01, n=94; Continuous model F(10,182)=4.71, p<.001, n=55. For
both models, r=.34 accounted for 12% of the variance. Continuous variables were centered at
their mean. Zero model was analyzed using a binary distribution, and continuous model was
analyzed using a lognormal distribution. Estimates for zero model are reported as log odds
values and estimates for the continuous model are reported as logged values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01,
*** p<.001.

Next, we examined the tribunal-venue model. Table 3 reflects
the results of the regression models for the tribunal-venue-based
approach. Neither the zero model [F(5,204)=2.04, p=.07, n=100] nor
the continuous model [F(5,204)=1.34, p=.24, n=58] significantly
predicted amounts awarded. There was still a medium effect size
(r=.30) accounting for 9% of the variance, possibly because the zero
215
model approached significance.
Despite both models lacking predictive ability, the development
status of arbitrators was linked to outcomes only in the tribunalvenue zero-model. One dummy variable related to the tribunal World
Bank development status individually predicted whether there would
be an award (versus a non-award). If all arbitrators on the tribunal
were nationals of states the World Bank classified as high income, as
compared to tribunals with two high-income arbitrators (and one

215. Because r-values are not available using two-part models, r was calculated for both
models simultaneously by estimating the correlation of predicted and expected outcomes.
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non-high income, developing-world arbitrator), then the award was
216
more likely to be zero (that is, no finding of state liability). There
were no other significant predictors of amounts awarded for either
217
the zero or continuous models using the tribunal-venue paradigm.

216. Similarly, we observe that the second dummy variable for the tribunals’ development
status was on the cusp of significance (p=.07). The direction was such that, when comparing
tribunals completely comprised of high-income arbitrators with tribunals containing two nonhigh-income (i.e. developing world) arbitrators, the awards rendered by high-income arbitrators
were more likely to be a zero (i.e. no finding of state liability).
217. Although it was non-significant (the parameter estimate was p=.07), there was a facial
trend with RP chairs and outcomes. Where a chair had more experience as arbitrator, the case
seemed to be more likely to result in an award (i.e. some form of state liability). As indicated in
footnote 204, for the 248 different arbitrators, 58.9% were involved in a single case. We
generated a binary variable that indicated whether each arbitrator—including the chair—in an
award arbitrated either a single case (i.e. a one-shot player, coded as “0”) or multiple cases (i.e.
a RP coded as “1”). In addition to the weighted chair repeat variable, we examined the chair’s
RP status using a second variable. For the set of 202 cases in the dataset, 13.4% (n=27) had a
chair that was a one-shot player; in slight contrast, for the set of 159 final awards, 15.1% (n=24)
had a chair that was a one-shot player. Using the binary variable to reflect a chair’s status as an
RP, instead of the weighted variable, changed the significance test for a repeat chair in the zeromodel, but not the continuous model (zero model: B=0.98, SE=0.48, t=2.02, p<0.05; continuous
model: B=1.09, SE=0.72, t=1.72, p=0.13). The non-significant patterns mirrored Waibel and
Wu’s tentative results. For ultimate liability in ICSID cases, they failed to identify that RP
chairs made different liability findings based on earlier appointments. For jurisdiction, where
investors previously appointed the arbitrator, chairs were more likely to find jurisdiction; but
chairs previously appointed by states were less likely to find jurisdiction; but there was no
relationship with jurisdiction decisions for chairs who had previously served as chairs. Waibel &
Wu, supra note 82, at 37–38.
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Table 3: Tribunal-Venue-related Two Part Regression Models
Predicting Amounts Awarded
Variable

B

SE

t

P

Intercept

1.09

0.32

3.50

<0.001***

Tribunal Gender
(0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman)

-0.19

0.48

-0.40

0.69

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two high income arbitrators)

-0.85

0.38

-2.27

<0.05*

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two non-high income,
developing world arbitrators)

-0.99

0.55

-1.81

0.07

Chair’s Status as Repeat Player

0.22

0.12

1.80

0.07

ICSID Venue
(0 = ICSID is the venue,
1 = ICSID is not the venue)

-0.13

0.39

-0.32

0.75

Continuous Model
16.65

0.67

29.70

<0.001***

Tribunal Gender
(0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman)

-0.21

0.74

-0.28

0.78

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two high income,
developing world arbitrators)

-0.47

0.62

-0.76

0.45

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two non-high income,
developing world arbitrators)

0.72

0.81

0.90

0.37

Chair’s Status as Repeat Player

0.12

0.18

0.63

0.53

ICSID Venue
(0 = ICSID is the venue,
1 = ICSID is not the venue)

-0.78

0.66

-1.19

0.24

Zero Model

Intercept

Zero model F(5,204)=1.90, p=.09, n=100; Continuous model F(5,204)=0.93, p=.46, n=58. For
both models, r=.30, accounting for 9% of the variance. Continuous variables were centered at
their mean. Zero model was analyzed using a binary distribution and continuous model was
analyzed using a lognormal distribution. Estimates for zero model are reported as log odds
values and estimates for the continuous model are reported as logged values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01,
*** p<.001.
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B. Relative Investor Success
Earlier models reflected amounts awarded, without reference to
investor’s relative success. Although examining amounts awarded is a
constructive way of understanding ITA outcomes, it nevertheless fails
to reflect the variance between claimants’ initial demand and the
ultimate result. To address this gap, and offer perspective of relative
outcomes, we tested the investors’ relative success variable using the
variables from the case-based and tribunal-venue-based models.
218
As with earlier analyses, relative success was the continuous
proportion outcome restricted by the interval (0, 1). As predictions
for relative success uses a proportion, this analysis excludes cases with
zero values; therefore, these models used regression with a beta
219
distribution and a logit link. Our aim was to estimate a model of
relative claimant success rate based on both the case-model and the
220
tribunal-venue models.
Table 4 reflects the results for the regression model of claimant’s
relative success using the case-based approach. Several aspects of the
case-based paradigm were replicated using investors’ relative success
as the method of understanding outcomes.
First, the regression model testing the case-based paradigm
significantly predicted claimant relative success [F(10, 40)=1.80,
p=.05, n=51]. The effect size was large (r=.56) and accounted for 31%
221
of the variance. Second, as with the zero-model exploring raw state
liability, investor identity significantly predicted investors’ relative
success rate, but this time, the only reliable predictor of investor222
identity was whether investors were humans. The nature of the

218. See supra Part IV.C.
219. Silvia L. P. Ferrari & Francisco Cribari-Neto, Beta Regression for Modelling Rates and
Proportions, 31 J. APPLIED STAT. 799, 799–811 (2004).
220. Although it was non-significant (parameter estimate was p=.11), a similar phenomenon
was present when comparing cases brought by people and those brought by a combination of
people and corporations. The relationship was that, facially, human beings had higher relative
success than cases initiated by a combined group.
221. Investor success rate models excluded cases where states won (that is, investor success
rate of 0%). This decreases n as compared to earlier models. When including success rates of
0%, the case-based model was non-predictive [F(10,89)=1.07, p=.38, n=100].
222. The FT500 variable was close to predicting relative investor success (p=.08). But see
infra note 224 (suggesting respondent democracy levels were also close to significance for
predicting outcomes). Using the broader conception of investor identity to consider the FT500
corporate chain, supra note 209, investors’ corporate chain was not a significant predictor of
ITA outcomes [B=0.62, SE=0.36, t=1.73, p=.09]. See also infra note 227 (indicating the original
FT500 variable, focusing only on the named investors, approached significance). Using the
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relationship was that cases with only people had higher relative
success rates than cases involving purely corporate entities.
Third, the expertise of counsel also significantly contributed to
ITA outcomes for relative investor success. Unlike the earlier
amounts awarded models, however, the important variable was not
that the investor’s counsel experience generated the significant link.
Rather, the experience that provided a meaningful predictor of
outcome was the expertise of respondent’s counsel. Specifically, a less
experienced state legal team resulted in greater relative investor
success; and a more experienced state legal team resulted in lower
223
relative investor success.
No other variables were significant
predictors of investors’ relative success in ITA.
As a final matter, although states’ democracy levels trended in
224
the direction of predicting investors’ relative success, the dummy
variables for respondent World Bank classification and the presence
225
of Argentina were not significant.

broader definition of investors’ FT500 status, the model was no longer significant at the p=.05
level [F(10,40)=1.76, p=.06, r=.56].
223. The experience of claimants’ legal team was non-significant (p=.11). To assess
robustness of the models and measures, we substituted the expertise of investors’ legal team and
respondents’ legal team to use the blunt composite binary variable described in note 211.
Substituting the binary variables of parties’ legal expertise in Table 4 for the weighted variables
of parties’ legal expertise rendered the model non-significant [F(10,40)=1.45, p=.15, n=51,
r=.53]. The expertise of respondents’ legal team no longer significantly predicted investors’
relative success [B=-0.28, SE=0.16, t=-1.76, p=.09]; claimants’ legal team was still a non-predictor
[B=0.34, SE=0.18, t=1.90, p=.06].
224. For Polity IV (p=.06), the greater a state’s democracy levels, the lower the investor’s
relative success; conversely, the lower a state’s democracy levels, the higher the investor’s
relative success. Unlike the zero-model, neither respondent’s World Bank classification nor
presence of Argentina was close to significance; and unlike the continuous model, respondent’s
World Bank classification was far from significant.
225. We again substituted both respondent HDI and OECD variables for World Bank to
assess model robustness. The case-based model of relative investor substituting HDI remained
significant [F(8,42)=2.19, p<.05, r=.56]; and, like the World Bank definition of development
status, HDI remained a non-significant predictor [B=1.74, SE=1.53, t=1.14, p=.26]. Likewise,
when using a state’s OECD membership as an alternative proxy for development status, the
case-based model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.50, p<.05, r=.56]. Although a state’s OECD
membership remained a non-significant predictor [B=0.71, SE=0.39, t=1.85, p=.07], there were
two other variations where variables became significant predictors. First, investors’ FT500 status
became a significant predictor (B=0.91, SE=0.40, t=2.28, p<0.05). Where the case involved at
least one FT500 company, investors had higher levels of relative success, but cases without any
FT500 entity experienced lower levels of relative success. Second, Polity IV became a significant
predictor when substituting OECD status [B=-0.02, SE=0.01, t=-2.02, p=0.05]. The pattern was
states with higher democracy levels had lower relative liability, whereas states with lower levels
of democracy experienced greater liability.
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Table 4: Case-related Regression Party/Attorney Regression Model
Predicting Claimant Relative Success Rate
Variable
Intercept

B
0.17

SE
0.65

t
0.26

p
0.80

Investor Type
(0 = human being, 1 = corporation)

-0.86

0.39

-2.23

<0.05*

Investor Type
(0 = human being,
1 = corporation and human being)

-1.78

1.08

-1.64

0.11

FT500 Corporation
(0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation,
1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation)

0.69

0.37

1.53

0.08

Claimant Attorney Experience

0.11

0.07

1.62

0.11

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent upper-middle income state)

-0.50

0.60

-0.83

0.41

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent lower-middle income state)

-0.47

0.62

-0.76

0.45

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent low income state)

-0.87

0.69

-1.26

0.21

Respondent Polity IV Score

-0.02

0.01

-1.91

0.06

Argentina
(0 = Respondent was not Argentina,
1 = Respondent was Argentina)

0.32

0.40

0.78

0.44

Respondent Attorney Experience

-0.21

0.07

-2.95

<0.01**

F(10,40)=1.80, p=.05, r=.56 (accounting for 32% of the variance). Continuous variables were
centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are reported as
log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table 5 reflects the results for the regression model of claimant’s
relative success using the tribunal-venue-based paradigm. Changing
the dependent variable to relative success replicated several aspects
of the earlier findings of the tribunal-venue model. First, the model
testing the tribunal-case-based paradigm also failed to predict relative
investor success [F(5,46)=0.63, p=.67, n=52]. The model had a small
effect size (r=.07) and accounted for less than 1% of the variance.
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Replicating earlier results for amounts awarded for both the zero
and continuous models, none of the individual variables significantly
226
predicted relative investor success. The only other variation from
the earlier model was that, unlike the zero-based model, the tribunal’s
composite development status did not significantly predict relative
investor success.
Table 5: Tribunal-Venue-Related Regression Model Predicting
Claimant Relative Success Rate
Variable
Intercept

B
-0.69

SE
0.30

t
-2.33

p
<0.05*

Tribunal Gender
(0 = all male, 1 = at least 1 woman)

-0.01

0.41

-0.02

0.98

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two high income arbitrators)

-0.24

0.33

-0.73

0.47

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two non-high income,
developing world arbitrators)

0.34

0.41

0.83

0.41

Chair’s Status as Repeat Player

-0.02

0.10

-0.15

0.88

ICSID Venue
(0 = ICSID is the venue,
1 = ICSID is not the venue)

0.25

0.37

0.70

0.49

F(5,46)=0.63, p=.67, r=.07 (accounted for less than 1% of the variance). Continuous variables
were centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are
reported as log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

C. A Combined Approach
As a final effort to explore relationships of variables from both
models, we generated a third hybrid model. The hybrid model used
investor success rate as our dependent variable and included variables
from both the case-based and arbitrator-venue-based models. To
estimate the relative contribution of the significant case-based
variables and significant arbitration-venue variables, we only included
variables that were significant in any of the earlier models. Results for

226. As with the zero and continuous models, see supra notes 204 and 217, we tested the
chair’s RP status using an alternative definition of previous appointments. The substitution
neither changed the significance of the tribunal-venue model [F(5,46)=0.63, p=.68, r=.08] nor
transformed a chair’s RP status to a significant predictor [B=-0.02, SE=0.36, t=-0.05, p=.96].
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the combined relative success rate regression model are presented in
Table 6. The combined model revealed that the model still predicted
investors’ relative success (F(8,40)=2.03, p<.05, n=51). There was also
a large effect size (r=.52) accounting for 27% of the variance.
The results provide evidence of the robustness of the variables in
the case-based model. The variables related to investor identity
remained significant. Where cases involved only human beings
bringing claims, investors were likely to achieve higher levels of
relative success than cases brought solely by corporations; yet,
simultaneously, FT500 entities were also more likely to experience
227
higher levels of success as compared to non-FT500 entities.
Similarly, the experience of respondents’ legal teams continued to
predict relative investor success. When states had experienced legal
teams, investors had lower levels of relative success. The relative
success of investors’ legal teams was, however, on the cusp of
significance (p=.07), but the direction remained consistent with
earlier tests whereby when investors had experienced teams, investors
228
had higher levels of relative success.
Other variables remained non-significant in the combined model.
The model was unable to identify any meaningful predictive value for
tribunal gender composition, composite tribunal development
229
status, chair experience, and whether ICSID was the venue. In a
slight variation, respondents’ Polity IV score no longer approached
significance for investor success.

227. FT500 resulted in a p=.05 significance test. Expanding FT500 to look at the corporate
chain altered the results (B=0.59, SE=0.36, t=1.63, p=0.11). The predictive ability of the model
went below the p<.05 threshold [F(8,40)=1.82, p=.07, r=.51], but the effect size remained large.
228. Substituting the weighted expertise of parties’ counsel to the binary variables of RP
counsel for both investors and states changed the results. The combined model was no longer
significant [F(8,40)=1.81, p=.07, r=.48]. Furthermore, neither claimants’ legal expertise [B=0.33,
SE=0.17, t=1.90, p=.06], nor respondents’ legal expertise was significant (B=-0.27, SE=0.16,
t=-1.71, p=.09) using the blunt binary definition.
229. We substituted HDI and OECD measures as proxies for states’ development status.
The HDI model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.03, p<.05, r=.52], and HDI was a nonsignificant predictor of investor success [B=0.03, SE=1.14, t=0.03, p=.98]. All other variables
retained similar levels when substituting HDI. Substituting states’ OECD membership likewise
changed nothing. The hybrid model remained significant [F(8,42)=2.23, p<.05, r=.51], but
OECD status was a non-significant predictor [B=0.41, SE=0.35, t=1.20, p=.24].
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Table 6: Combined Model Predicting Claimant Relative Success Rate
Variable
Intercept

B
0.29

SE
0.50

t
0.58

p
<0.05*

Investor Type
(0 = human being, 1 = corporation)

-0.97

0.40

-2.31

<0.05*

Investor Type
(0 = human being,
1 = corporation and human being)

-1.85

1.09

-1.70

0.10

FT500 Corporation
(0 = Investor(s) not FT500 corporation,
1 = Investor(s) was FT500 corporation)

1.07

0.43

2.47

0.05*

Claimant Attorney Experience

0.12

0.07

2.87

0.07

Respondent Attorney Experience

-0.20

0.08

-2.55

<0.05*

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent upper-middle income state)

-0.44

0.61

-0.72

0.48

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent lower-middle income state)

-0.40

0.64

-0.62

0.54

Respondent World Bank Classification
(0 = Respondent high income state,
1 = Respondent low income state)

-0.60

0.68

-0.88

0.39

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two high income arbitrators)

-0.06

0.34

-0.17

0.87

Arbitrators’ World Bank Classification
(0= all high income arbitrators,
1 = two non-high income,
developing world arbitrators)

0.67

0.39

1.71

0.10

F(8,40)=2.03, p<.05, r=.52 (accounting for 27% of the variance). Continuous variables were
centered at their mean. Model was analyzed using a beta distribution. Estimates are reported as
log odds values. * p≤.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

The results suggest that the two most robust predictors of ITA
outcomes involved investor identity and the experience of parties’
lawyers. One might hypothesize that these variables may be
entangled and counsel provide a screening function to identify quality
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claims and defenses. Specifically, sophisticated counsel with an
appreciation of the likely merits of a claim may be unwilling to take a
case if they believe it will generate a loss or undermine their firm
reputation; sophisticated counsel may also actively pursue
meritorious cases. Likewise, unsophisticated counsel eager to break
into the ITA marketplace, and who may not fully appreciate the
complexities of securing favorable outcomes, may represent clients in
less meritorious cases. As the data reflected differences in how
counsel’s expertise affected outcomes—with expert investor counsel
predicting liability and amounts awarded but expert respondent
counsel predicting relative investor success—it is possible that any
231
screening function operates differently for investors and states. It is
also theoretically possible that, irrespective of a screening function,
quality lawyers may be more adept at selecting arbitrators, making
procedural decisions, selecting legal arguments that are more likely to
be favorable to their clients, or some interaction of those variables.
Ultimately, future research should explore legal expertise to
understand its impact on the market for legal services and the impact
on ITA outcomes.
VI. LIMITATIONS
It is important to understand the results within their proper
context as it restrains the strength of derivative inferences. Part III
identified limitations of case selection bias. For non-significant
results, Part V identified limitations related to statistical power. This
section reinforces those concerns and identifies other limitations.
First, there may be limitations to the strength of the inferences,
as they may not reflect population parameters. Inferences should be
made cautiously, particularly considering the representativeness of
subsets. Replication with additional data is necessary to avoid

230. In medical malpractice, there is evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully screen
cases, weed out less meritorious claims, and thereby contribute to a case selection effect. Hyman
& Silver, supra note 160, at 1086–88, 1101–03, 1117–22; see also Engstrom, supra note 156, at
1263–64, 1301 (discussing the speculation that more experienced firms selectively cherry pick
the most meritorious cases to pursue or defend).
231. Experienced investor counsel may be adept at distinguishing between promising and
unmeritorious claims. By contrast, experienced state counsel may be adept at identifying cases
suitable for a compelling damages witness, conducting effective cross-examination of expert
damages witnesses, or using experience to reduce damages. It is possible that experienced
respondent counsel affected outcomes in more subtle ways, like evaluating the merits of claims,
the risks of ITA, and encouraging settlements prior to a public award.
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establishing parameters that could reflect random chance. Second, it
is always possible that there was an insufficient sample size to predict
non-significant outcomes. In models that significantly predicted
outcomes, effect sizes were small to medium, suggesting sufficient
power. In models that were non-significant, effect sizes were small to
nonexistent, again suggesting that power was not problematic.
However, it would be prudent to establish a broader pool of data,
based on an a priori power analysis, to confirm, contradict, or
supplement these findings.
Third, there may be issues related to external validity since the
results come from data based on publicly available awards. It is
possible that publicly available awards do not represent the broader
population of both public and private awards. The data used for the
analyses was coded from awards that were publicly available as of
January 1, 2012. Since there is now additional data, future research
should replicate the analysis. There could be case selection bias.
Although anecdotal comments suggest the data is representative, this
has not been empirically confirmed. Further research should consider
the effect of case selection bias.
Fourth, it is possible that the models were underspecified.
Although the case-based variables reliably predicted ITA outcomes
in the case-based and hybrid models, other case-related variables
232
could influence outcome. These might involve the presence of thirdparty funding, the type of government activity at issue, the underlying
cause of action, or the industrial sector involved in the dispute.
Although we were unable to isolate any reliable differences when
233
comparing energy disputes with others, we nevertheless recognize
that other factors may contribute meaningfully to a case outcome.
Likewise, as the tribunal-venue model never reliably predicted ITA
outcomes, it is possible that introducing more granular information
about arbitrator identity could predict outcomes. In theory, different
types of arbitrator experience—such as common and/or civil law
training, service as counsel or arbitrator in a commercial law dispute,
involvement in adjudicating public international law disputes, service
as a government official, background as an academic, or arbitrator
234
age—could generate reliable variance. As those factors were not

232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 32, 179 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, The Influence of Arbitrator
Background and Representation on Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 43, 46–48
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identifiable in the publicly available arbitration awards, they were
beyond the scope of this research but could prove fruitful in future
analyses. Similarly, the venue-related variables might be expanded to
also explore specific variation in arbitration venues and the applicable
law at the venue, including whether the enforcement regime involves
235
the New York or ICSID Convention.
As a result of these cautionary considerations, more research is
required to create the sufficient power, stability, statistical control,
and enhanced validity necessary to reach more definitive conclusions.
It will likely take years—if not decades—before there is a sufficient
pool of awards available to run the requisite analysis. While it makes
future research challenging, it does not diminish that this research
confirms, and expand, upon existing analyses. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to respect the limitations of statistical power and other risks
of error.
VII. DISCUSSION
These data elucidate ITA and shed some light on whether ITA is
a predictable form of dispute settlement. The first point is that
additional research should be done to expand the knowledge base.
Collecting additional data, conducting balanced and methodologically
sound research on investors, states, lawyers, amounts claimed, and
236
outcomes could provide a more nuanced picture of the state of ITA.
Secondly, the data call into question conventional
237
characterizations that ITA outcomes exhibit pro-investor bias.
Although nontrivial amounts were involved in investor claims, the
descriptive data either reflected a state-favorable or rough balance in
outcomes. For the subset of cases where investors won, investors
(2014) (exploring variables related to arbitrator background in FINRA arbitration that
influence outcomes); Waibel & Wu, supra note 82, at 26–29, 31–38 (exploring variables related
to arbitrator identity and outcomes).
235. We also explored, using the tribunal-venue model, whether the model varied if we
switched the ICSID venue variable to look for differences between those awards rendered
under the ICSID Convention or under the New York Convention. None of those analyses
indicated that a change in the variable generated a deviation in either the non-significance of
the model or the predictive utility of individual variables.
236. See Reinert, supra note 157, at 846 (making similar suggestions for Bivens litigation).
237. Concerns of “pro-investor” bias in ITA should be distinguished from concerns about
the substantive international law rights granted in treaties. The distinction permits
disentanglement of claims of “bias” relating to dispute settlement and other concerns about
systemic balance deriving from a state’s creation of a treaty that affirmatively grants foreign
investors broad unilateral substantive rights.
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generally only obtained roughly one-third of their claimed
compensation. These results were akin to limited plaintiff success in
whistleblower, qui tam, Bivens, or medical-malpractice litigation,
which experienced respondent-favorable outcomes. Other empirical
research on U.S. domestic litigation suggests that success rates in ITA
were similar to respondent-favorable or state-favorable outcomes.
238
Finally, despite concerns about the lack of consistency and
239
predictability in ITA, case-related and hybrid models demonstrated
that ITA outcomes exhibited a degree of predictability, and the
results were not completely random. The variables most likely to
predict outcomes were arguably case selection effects, including
investor identity and the presence of experienced counsel.
For investor identity, two variables pointed in somewhat
different directions and produce a challenging question about which
investors should benefit from ITA.
For cases involving people, investors fared relatively well, which
suggests that ITA provided a critical service for human beings. In
those circumstances, ITA prevented small, less powerful investors
from being marginalized because of limited economic and political
leverage; and it offered small investors an opportunity to obtain legal
redress for arguable government misconduct. Although human beings
bringing cases experienced relatively high success rates, these cases
need not be threatening to states. For example, those cases may have
involved small investments and small amounts claimed, particularly as
compared to larger multinationals. Likewise, with cases involving
small constituencies or closely held corporations, it may be possible to
generate targeted settlements prior to initiating arbitration that more
closely align with the individual interests.
For cases involving larger multinational entities, specifically
FT500 entities, ITA provided comparatively better relief for large
investors even though a relatively privileged economic position may
have provided other ways to redress arguably problematic
government conduct. Nevertheless, FT500 entities may also have
experienced economic consequences so severe that their privileged

238. See generally Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418 (2013) (arguing that the fragmented
sources of law for investment treaty arbitration make for inherently inconsistent results). See
also Roberts, supra note 44, at 55 (identifying doctrinal inconsistency in ITA cases); supra note
149 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of using only publically available data).
239. See Note, supra note 11, at 2548.
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positions were insufficient to redress potential harm. An alternative
way of understanding the results of investor identity is that some
investors appreciated the value of their claims, had a firm
appreciation for the merits of their claims, or had nothing to lose by
initiating ITA. For individuals, ITA perhaps involved “bet the
company” disputes where they were aware of the value of their
investment and had no desire to pursue further investments within a
host state; and, in those circumstances, ITA perhaps provided the
only viable method for obtaining meaningful relief. Large
corporations, meanwhile, may have appreciated that, by suing a state,
they risked their other commercial interests within the state and
potentially jeopardized their worldwide reputation. As such, they may
have been cautious in initiating ITA; and they may have only pursued
the most meritorious claims or those claims affecting the company’s
240
ongoing fiscal viability. As these are not the only explanatory
241
narratives, investor identity remains a critical but complex variable.
For attorneys, similar to the research of Marc Galanter, the
results demonstrated that counsel experience predicted outcomes.
Although experienced counsel affected outcomes for all parties, the
effect was different for investors and states.
For investors, having experienced counsel was only linked to two
types of outcomes, namely whether the state was ever liable (using
the zero-model) or the amount awarded (using the continuous
model). This may suggest that sophisticated investors’ counsel was
adept at distinguishing among cases that were “winners” or might
generate large awards, and therefore experienced counsel provided a
critical screening function for investors. But the results may also
reflect that insider experience in selecting the forum, selecting
arbitrators, generating claims, and advocacy were critical to
outcomes.
For states, having experienced counsel was linked only with
investors’ relative success, whereby states represented by more

240. Theoretically, when claimants teeter on bankruptcy, bankruptcy trustees might need to
pursue claims where a finding of liability is a company’s core asset. Some cases involved
investors who were in liquidation or bankruptcy. See GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶ 68 (Mar. 31, 2011); Siag & Vecchi v. Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 117 (June 1, 2009); Loewen Group v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 29 (June 26, 2003).
241. Other explanations might be that tribunals are sympathetic to cases involving
vulnerable individuals, tribunals are sympathetic to large corporations in difficult political
situations, the legal merits affected determinations, or some other variable(s).
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experienced legal teams were associated with outcomes where
investors did relatively worse. This may suggest that state counsel
were adept in decreasing investors’ claimed damages by virtue of
their skill in appointing quality experts, cross-examining the damage
experts of the investor, or otherwise making an effective case. It could
also mean, however, that arbitrators were persuadable by
experienced counsel, that arbitrators were sympathetic to the
arguments of states, or that tribunals were skilled at identifying
nonmeritorious damages and reducing liability accordingly. Should
states negotiating treaties wish to address attorney experience, there
are two potential options. First, they might attempt to directly
regulate the legal profession involved in investment dispute
settlement; this, however, would be a novel tactic. Second, faced with
a claim, states can actively explore who to retain as defense counsel;
and data suggested states were best served by counsel with ITA
experience—but that relationship is not necessarily causal. The
expertise could derive from developing in-house capacity or
strategically securing external counsel.
These observations have policy ramifications. Claims about ITA,
and derivative normative solutions, should be assessed in light of
properly gathered and analyzed data. Offering base rate information
about ITA outcomes aids stakeholders in minimizing the risk of
cognitive illusions influencing information gathering and decision
242
making. For states considering excluding ITA from treaties on the
premise that ITA disfavors them, they may wish to reevaluate that
proposition as a basis for eliminating ITA. They may also view ITA
as a way to vindicate appropriate state policy choices. For investors
hoping to secure relief from ITA, they should appreciate the risks of
pursuing ITA and the low degree of relative investor success.
Stakeholders may wish to consider the analyses carefully and respect
the limitations when engaging in policy debates. By considering
evidence in context, stakeholders are better positioned to create
evidence-based normative solutions that redress real, rather than
imagined, problems.
Although ITA is not perfect, the data cast doubt on the
assumption that eradication of ITA is the only solution to perceived

242. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
LAWYERS 73–75 (2012) (describing the cognitive illusions that affect lawyers); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124,
1124–28 (1974) (discussing cognitive illusions).
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problems. Likewise, the data cast doubt on a triumphalist narrative
about the value of ITA. Rather, the data suggested ITA outcomes are
complex. Strategic adaptations to a complex problem are more
normatively appropriate. We propose that, where states choose to
provide investors with substantive rights, the question should be how
best to provide dispute resolution. Recognizing that resolution in
national courts might, fairly or unfairly, generate concerns related to
perceived bias and any national-court judgment will face substantial
243
doctrinal enforcement challenges,
the objective should be to
improve dispuFte settlement by making it as efficacious and fair as
possible. We therefore recommend three structural safeguards.
First, stakeholders may wish to explore creating an appellate
body to articulate clear rules, to harmonize inconsistent applications
244
of law, and to redress substantive inconsistency. Post award clarity
could generate prospective predictability allowing investors and states
to organize their conduct in accordance with those determinations.
The enhanced predictability, determinacy and consistency of
245
outcomes could enhance ITA legitimacy. Moreover, having clear
interpretive rules from an appellate body facilitates future
quantitative modeling that reliably controls for a claim’s legal merits.
The creation of a reliable legal baseline for analyzing investment
disputes also promotes complimentary dispute settlement
mechanisms, such as negotiation and mediation, that depend upon
clear rules and adjudicative integrity to “bargain in the shadow of the
246
law.”
Second, should stakeholders be dissatisfied by the degree of
predictability from the models or otherwise discontent with their
243. Although there is a convention on enforcement of foreign court judgments, the treaty is
both of limited scope and not in force and effect. By contrast, international arbitration has a
robust enforcement regime. Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Court Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150,
150–51 (2013).
244. For ICSID Convention disputes, the annulment process provides for limited procedural
grounds for annulling all or part of the award. For New York Convention disputes, there is
likewise no appeal; but grounds for challenging or setting aside awards are governed by the seat
of arbitration’s law and limited grounds under the New York Convention.
245. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 21, at 1524, 1584–87.
246. Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 246–47 (1982); Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 968–71 (1979); see also Jürgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejection of Investor-State
Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication, 27 ICSID REV. 65, 69 (2012) (exploring
difficulties of being unable to “bargain in the shadow of the law”).
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ability to effectively influence predictors, they may wish to pursue
other forms of dispute settlement. Negotiation or mediation, for
example, could compliment, support, or replace ITA. Predispute
conflict management, negotiation or mediation could eliminate
formal disputes. Likewise, even after a dispute has crystalized,
mediation may minimize the scope of the dispute or address conflicts
that arise during arbitration. Use of these forms of dispute settlement
could save time and costs. For investors interested in ongoing
investments within a state, these processes could preserve
relationships. Mediation also means states need not outsource dispute
settlement to arbitrators; and parties can retain control over the
outcome by generating solutions that need not purely involve fiscal
remuneration. Several treaties recommend “amicable settlement” of
247
investment disputes. Yet, the broad and undefined reference
generates confusion, particularly within states, about how settlement
discussions occur, the procedural ground rules for the discussions,
who will serve as a mediator (if any), and a myriad of other
248
procedural concerns.
When negotiating treaties, states may
therefore wish to provide clear guidelines about how, when, and
where to use alternative forms of dispute settlement. States may wish
to consider incorporation of the recent Rules for Investor-State
249
Mediation or create a separate annex providing detail on mediation
250
protocols.
Third, given the value of providing access to justice for smaller
entities and people, stakeholders may wish to explore the possibility
of creating a small-claims facility or other body to provide redress to
investors that may lack economic and political advantages. For
human beings who might wish to access dispute settlement, a small
claims facility could provide immediate, efficient and cost-effective
access to justice. This solution reflects the success that people

247. Franck, DSD, supra note 27, at 191–93; see also Note, supra note 11, at 2545 (noting
that not all treaties provide for amicable settlement of disputes).
248. See supra note 27 (identifying sources discussing practices related to amicable
settlement, negotiation, mediation, and the derivative challenges).
249. STATE MEDIATION SUBCOMM., INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE
MEDIATION (2012), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8120ED11F3C8-4A66-BE81-77CB3FDB9E9F [http://perma.cc/PHX7-L3TB].
250. This was originally proposed in the European Union-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement ch. 14, annex II (Oct. 5, 2012), http://eu-secretdeals.info/
upload/2014/02/CETA-Dispute-Settlement-Chapter-December-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5H4353RF].
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experienced, but captures states’ risk by creating a single facility for
streamlined dispute settlement of small-value claims.
Ultimately, these recommendations will require assessment and
adaptation based upon data and the experience of stakeholders.
Although the results demonstrated ITA was not completely
unpredictable, states should pursue normative solutions designed to
improve ITA and dispute settlement. Should states choose to grant
substantive rights but fail to provide an effective forum for dispute
settlement, there may be negative externalities that will minimize the
potential joint gains derived from treaties promoting economic
integration. In any event, the results of the data necessitate that
debates about the future of ITA remain both robust and professional.
Nevertheless, the debate will benefit from evidence-based insights,
relying on data, and minimizing the influence of nonreplicable
intuition that may create normative solutions that—while emotively
satisfying—are suboptimal.
CONCLUSION
Without a careful analysis of ITA outcomes, it is not possible to
generate proper normative reforms. The analyses in this Article
neither suggested that ITA exhibited a pro-investor bias nor
otherwise demonstrated that ITA was wholly unpredictable. While
concern is understandable given the stakes for the international
political economy, care must be taken to avoid generating dispute
resolution systems that could generate suboptimal outcomes or
normative solutions that either redresses the wrong problem or fails
to address a subsisting harm.
ITA outcomes were a complicated, multivariate phenomenon,
and proposals for reform must be tested against data, lest a hasty
transition harm the economic and political interests of international
trade and investment agreements. Ultimately, international
investment law may be best served by designing dispute resolution
systems tailored to generate meaningful solutions to demonstrable
problems. By focusing on variables reliably linked to ITA outcomes,
rather than variables with an intuitive appeal that do not withstand
empirical scrutiny, stakeholders can properly assess ITA’s value in a
time of international economic transition.

